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Predictably, every stranger-owned life insurance scheme must confront the insurable
interest requirement. In life insurance as in all other lines of insurance, an insurable
interest requirement is fundamental to the insurance contract. Additionally,
stranger-owned life insurance plans must tiptoe through the related area of policy
assignments. There are often very fine lines between legitimate life settlements
and invalid wagering arrangements.'
INTRODUCTION
Over three-quarters of American families own some form of life insur-
ance, bringing total life insurance coverage in the United States to
more than $18 trillion.2 Yet, until very recently, persons who held un-
needed, unaffordable, or unwanted life insurance policies due to altered
life circumstances had only two limited options: (1) they could either
allow their life insurance policies to lapse, in which case the policyholders
lost all their investment; or (2) they could "surrender" their policy to the
life insurance company for a predetermined "cash surrender value," which
1. Douglas R. Richmond, Investing in the Grim Reaper: Insurable Interest and Assignment in
Life Insurance, 47 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. LJ. 657, 691 (2012).
2. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, 2010 LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 63 (2010).
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typically amounts to only 3 percent to 5 percent of the policy's face value
and sometimes zero percent.3
The emergence of a third option-a robust secondary market for life
insurance-is a relatively recent phenomenon. The fundamental aspect of
a life settlement transaction, whether characterized as a life insurance viat-
ical, a life settlement, or a stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI)
scheme, is fairly simple: A terminally ill policyholder (for viaticals) or an
elderly policyholder, frequently with impaired health (for life settlements
and STOLI), sells his or her life insurance policy to a third party life set-
tlement provider and investors for an amount that is lower than the policy's
death benefit but higher than the policy's cash surrender value.4
One influential study conducted at the Wharton Business School es-
timates that more than 20 percent of policyholders over the age of sixty-
five hold life insurance policies that exceed their cash surrender value;
this means that the potential market for life settlements is close to
$100 billion.5 Not surprisingly, a number of traditional life insurance
companies have been trying to block the growth of the life settlement
industry and limit what they perceive is competition for policy surrender
options. In the most extreme cases, traditional life insurance companies
have prohibited their agents from advising clients of the availability of
life settlement options, even when a life settlement may be the most sui-
table financial choice for a particular client. Indeed, some insurance agents
and brokers have been disciplined or even terminated from employment
for discussing life settlement options with their clients.6 Nevertheless, a
substantial majority of trade publications and commentators have en-
dorsed and supported these newly emerging life settlement options and
a secondary market for life insurance, 7 although legal commentators
3. Life Insurance Settlement Association (LISA) White Paper, Cashing in on Unneeded Life
Insurance Policies: How Seniors Are Benefiting From Life Settlements, at 5 (Aug. 22, 2006),
http://www.lisassociation.org/files/LISA whitepaper.pdf; see also Sachin Kohli, Pricing
Death: Analyzing the Secondary Market for Life Insurance Policies and Its Regulatory Environment,
54 BUFF. L. REV. 279, 280 (2006). Life insurance companies "traditionally held monopsony
power over policyholders because they were the only re-purchasers of in-force life insurance
policies." Id.
4. See, e.g., Life Partners Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying Va. law)
(involving a disputed viatical life settlement); Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596
F. Supp. 2d 882 (D. NJ. 2009) (applying NJ. and Cal. Law) (involving a disputed STOLI
life settlement).
5. Neil A. Doherty & Hal J. Singer, The Benefits of a Secondary Market for Lift Insurance
Policies, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 449, 452 53 (2003 2004).
6. Brian Brooks & Elizabeth Baird, Clients May Hold Millions in Untapped Insurance Wealth,
Study Finds, ON WALL ST., at 2 (Nov. 2002); see also Doherty & Singer, supra note 5, at 474-75.
7. See, e.g., Doherty & Singer, supra note 5; Harold G. Ingraham Jr. & Sergio S. Salani,
Life Settlements as a Viable Option, J. OF FIN. SERV. PROFS. 72 76 (Sept. 2004); Eileen Shovlin,
Clearing Up Common Misconceptions About Life Settlements, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE &
HEALTH MAG., Dec. 10, 2001; Robin S. Weinberger & Peter N. Katz, Business Changes
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have taken a more nuanced and critical approach, especially regarding
STOLI settlements.8
The elephant in the room, however, for the life settlement industry is
the crucial concept that viatical settlements, life settlements, and STOLI
settlements all constitute stranger-owned life insurance and therefore
may, or may not, constitute a void ab initio insurance contract, based
upon the lack of a bona fide insurable interest in the life of another person.9
The purpose of this article is to explore and analyze the crucial inter-
relationship and the present tension existing between various life settle-
ment alternatives and the insurable interest requirement for life insurance.
Does the 240-year-old insurable interest doctrine adequately meet the
needs of a modern society in recognizing a secondary market for life in-
surance? If so, what additional remedies, if any, are available to both
the insured and the insurer to legally protect the contractual rights and
reasonable expectations of the parties?
Part I of this article presents a comprehensive discussion of the insur-
able interest requirement for life insurance, including the origin and pur-
pose for the insurable interest doctrine; the incorporation of this doctrine
into American judicial and statutory law; the necessary parameters of the
insurable interest requirement for life insurance; and, most importantly
for life settlement purposes, the assignment of life insurance policies to
one who lacks an insurable interest in the life of another. Part II discusses
the evolution, regulation, viability, and legality of viaticals and life settle-
ments in the secondary insurance market today and argues that preexist-
ing unneeded or unwanted life insurance policies should be freely assign-
Can Mean Life Settlement Opportunities, LIFEHEALTHPRO (Feb. 28, 2012), available at www.
lifehealthpro.co/2012/02/28; Constance M. Buerger, The Secondary Market for Life Insurance
Is Poised to Go Mainstream Are You Ready? CAL. BROKER 20 22 (Feb. 2004); Life Insurance
Settlement Association (LISA) 'White Paper, supra note 2; Robert Buechner, Stranger-Owned
Life Insurance: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 19 OHIO PROB. L.J. 7 (2008); M. Bryan Free-
man, Life Settlements Enter the Mainstream, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH MAG.,
Sept. 19, 2005, at 20; Tom Lauricella, The Cost of Cashing Out Life Insurance, WALL ST. J.,
June 30, 2013, at 2; Alan Jensen & Stephan R. Leimberg, Stranger Owned Life Insurance: A
Point/Counterpoint Discussion, 33 ACTEC J. 110 (Fall 2007) (presenting both sides of the
life settlement debate); see also GLORIA WOLK, VIATICALS AND LIFE SETTLEMENTS: AN INVES
TOR'S GUIDE (2005). But see contra Deloitte Consulting LLP & Univ. of Conn., The Life Set-
tlement Market: An Actuarial Perspective on Consumer Economic Value (2005) (concluding that
"for the majority of policyholders with impaired health, the greatest economic value results
from retaining the [life insurance] contract until death").
8. See, e.g., Kohli, supra note 3; Eryn Mathews, STOLI on the Rocks: Why States Should
Eliminate the Abusive Practice of Stranger-Owned Life Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 521
(2008); Susan Lorde Martin, Betting on the Lives of Strangers: Life Settlements, STOLI, and
Securitization, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 173 (2010).
9. See generally Peter Nash Swisher, The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance: A
Critical Reassessment, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 477 (2005), reprinted in 55 DEFENSE L. J. 527 (2006)
abridged and reprinted in 5 ICFAI J. INS. L. 41 (2007) (Institute of Chartered Financial Ana-
lysts of India); see also infra Part I.
STOLI: Wagering on the Lives of Strangers 707
able to viatical and life settlement providers and investors who do not have
an insurable interest in the life of the insured. Part III analyzes and crit-
icizes controversial STOLI schemes that lack an insurable interest
requirement in the life of another but do not fall under the assignability
exception that viaticals and life settlements arguably do. Part IV of this
article concludes that, although further state regulation in the secondary
life insurance market may be desirable, existing legal precedent presently
is sufficient in most states to legally validate viaticals and life settlements,
while at the same time declaring most STOLI schemes to be fraudulent,
deceitful, and void ab initio contracts based upon the lack of a bona fide
insurable interest in the life of another.
I. THE INSURABLE INTEREST REQUIREMENT FOR
LIFE INSURANCE
Life insurance generally includes all policies of insurance in which the in-
surer's payment is contingent on the death of a specified individual.1 His-
torically, life insurance has long been validated by most American courts
from a legal, economic, and social perspective as a well-recognized invest-
ment device to shift and distribute the risk of loss from an untimely or pre-
mature death.11 However, in order to secure insurance on the life of an-
other, an insurable interest in that life is required in order to prevent
wagering contracts and the unwelcome possibility of homicide. 2 Accord-
ingly, almost all American jurisdictions today, by judicial case law, legisla-
tive statute, or both, now require that a bona fide insurable interest exist for
life insurance, or the life insurance policy in question will be declared null
and void based upon very strong public policy grounds.13 This insurable
10. See, e.g., Bowles v. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 99 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir.
1938) (quoting Mut. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Dobler, 137 F. 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1905)).
11. See, e.g., Helverig v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941).
12. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Hopkins, 614 A. 2d 96, 98 (Md. 1992) (holding that the primary
purpose of the prohibition of insuring another person's life without a bona fide insurable in-
terest "is to prevent wagering on the life of another, although.., prevention of murder is an-
other rationale"); Rubenstein v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 584 F. Supp. 272, 279 (E.D. La.
1984) (noting similar purposes); see also Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Killing of Insured by
Benefiiary as Affecting Life Insurance or Its Proceeds, 27 A.L.R.3d 794 (1969 and Supp. 2014);
see generally Swisher, supra note 9, at 478 80. For a fascinating discussion of earlier notorious
miscreants and murderers, see ALEXANDER C. CAMPBELL, INSURANCE AND CRME (1902).
13. See generally FRANKLIN L. BEST, JR., LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE LAW Ch. 4:1-4:6
(2012); ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSUIRANCE LAW
§ 43 (5th ed. 2012); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALANJ. WIDISS, INStRANCE LAW § 3.5 (1988);JEF
FREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 1.05 (3d ed. & 2014 Cum.
Supp.); LEE R. Russ & THOMAS SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE §§ 36:77 36:92, 41:17
41:24, 43:1 43:29 (3d ed. 1997); EDWIN PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 162
66 (2d ed. 1957); WILLIAM R. VANCE & BUIST M. ANDERSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF IN
SURANCE §§ 31 34 (3d ed. 1951); GEORGE RICHARDS, RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE
§§ 34-37 (4th ed. 1932); see also 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance §§ 978 1003 (2003). But see contra
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interest requirement also applies to viatical settlements, life settlements,
and STOLI settlements as well, 14 as will be further discussed below.
A. Origin and Purpose for The Insurable Interest Doctrine in Life Insurance
Prior to the end of the eighteenth century, English courts permitted and
enforced various gaming and wagering contracts made by persons who
had absolutely no insurable interest in the life of another person. Gam-
bling on the lives of others was a relatively common practice in eighteenth
century England, where the institution resembled modern day sports bet-
ting. Popular accounts of that period describe the practice of purchasing
life insurance on individuals tried for capital crimes and betting on
whether the individual would be convicted and executed or exonerated.
Another practice was insuring the lives of famous, elderly persons, who
may have suffered from a recent illness affecting their life expectancy. A
duel with an insured over a perceived slight of honor might also hasten
his or her untimely death. 15
By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, such wagering activ-
ities on the lives of others began to attract significant public hostility. 16
Consequently, the British Parliament in 1774 passed a statute holding
that any life insurance contract without a bona fide insurable interest in
the life of another would henceforth be null and void. 17 Unfortunately,
Jacob Loshin, Note: Insurance Law's Hapless Busybody: A Case Against the Insurable Interest Re-
quirement, 117 YALE L.J. 474 (2007 2008) (arguing that the insurable interest doctrine "in-
vites unfairness and inefficiency in the insurance market").
14. See, e.g., BEST, supra note 13, Ch. 4:4; LEO MARTINEZ ET AL., NEW APPLEMEN INSUR
ANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 34.09[3][e] (2013 ed.); see also Douglas R. Richmond, Investing
with the Grim Reaper: Insurable Interest and Assignment in Life Insurance, 47 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAc. L.J. 657 (2012); Robert S. Bloink, Catalysts for Clarification: Modern Twists on the Insur-
able Interest Requirement for Life Insurance, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 55 (2010); Martin, supra note 8;
Eryn Matthews, STOLI on the Rocks: fWhy States Should Eliminate the Abusive Practice of
Stranger-Owned Life Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 521 (2008).
15. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 13, at 255 258: Bloink, supra note 14, at 61
63; see generally GEOFFREY W. CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE
IN ENGLAND 1695 1775 (1999).
16. CLARK, supra note 15, at 52 53.
17. See Life Assurance Act, 1774, 14 Geo. III, c. 48, sec.1 (Eng.). The Act provided in rel-
evant part:
'Whereas it hath be found by Experience, that the making Insurances on Lives, or other
Events, wherein the Assured shall have no Interest, hath introduced a mischievous Kind
of Gaming: For Remedy whereof, be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty,
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons,
and by the Authority of the same, That from and after the passing of this Act, no Insurance
shall be made by any Person or Persons, Bodies Politick or Corporate, on the Life or Lives
of any Person or Persons ... wherein the Person or Persons for whose Use, Benefit, or on
whose Account such Policy or Policies shall be made, shall have no Interest, or by way of
Gaming or Wagering; and that every Assurance made, contrary to the true Intent and
Meaning hereof, shall be null and void, to all Intents and Purposes whatsoever.
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Parliament left to the courts the daunting task of how to interpret and en-
force this poorly drafted act.18
The underlying purpose of an insurable interest requirement in life in-
surance, as originally enacted in England in 1774, and as later adopted by
most American courts and state legislatures, was two-fold: (1) to discou-
rage the practice of using life insurance as a gambling or wagering device
and (2) to remove the incentive for the procurer of life insurance to com-
mit homicide. 19
B. Incorporation of The Insurable Interest Doctrine into American Case Law
and Statutory Law
During the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, most
American courts recognized the insurable interest requirement for life in-
surance policies, based upon earlier English precedent.20 For example, in
the 1876 case of Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Schaefer,21 Justice
Bradley declared:
It is generally agreed that mere wager policies-that is, policies in which the
insured party has no interest whatever in the matter insured, but only an in-
terest in its loss of destruction-are void as against public policy ... [citing to
an English statute regarding marine risks, and "with regard to lives" the stat-
ute of 14 Geo. III, c. 48] .... In this country, statutes to the same effect have
been passed in some of the States; but where they have not been, in most
cases either the English statutes have been considered as operative, or the
older common law has been followed. 22
In the United States, the insurable interest doctrine for life insurance
was adopted by a vast majority of state courts23 and subsequently ratified
and confirmed by a vast majority of state legislatures, where the insurable
interest statutes for life insurance were enacted within comprehensive
18. See generally Robert Merkin, Gambling by Insurance: A Study of the Life Assurance Act of
1774, 9 ANGLo-AMERICAN L. REV. 331 (1980).
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 13, at
258; Swisher, supra note 9, at 481 82; Richmond, supra note 14, at 669.
20. BEST, supra note 13, Ch. 4:1; VANCE & ANDERSON, supra note 13, § 31.
21. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457 (1876).
22. Id. at 460.
23. See, e.g, Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. George, 28 So. 2d 910, 912 (Ala. 1947);
Home Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Masterson, 21 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Ark. 1929); Boyer v. U.S. Fid.
& Guar. Co., 274 P. 57, 60 (Cal. 1929); Knott v. State ex re. Guar. Income Life Ins. Co.,
186 So. 788, 789 90 (Fla. 1939); Colgrove v. Lowe, 175 N.E. 569, 571 (Ill. 1931); Newton
v. Hicks' Adm'r, 138 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 1940); Katona v. Colonial Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 173 A. 99, 100 (N.J.C.P. 1934); Werenzinski v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 14
A.2d 279, 280 81 (Pa. 1940); Washington v. Atl. Life Ins. Co., 136 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tenn.
1940); Green v. Sw. Voluntary Ass'n., 20 S.E. 2d 694, 696 (Va. 1942).
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state insurance codes.24 Thus, today-by case law, statutory law, or both-
an insurable interest at the inception of a life insurance contract appears to
be required in every state,25 and the burden of proof to demonstrate such
an insurable interest is on the claimant who has procured insurance on the
life of another.26
Although the language in numerous judicial opinions and state statutes
as to what constitutes a valid bona fide insurable interest in the life of an-
other varies from state to state, there is a general consensus that an insur-
able interest in a life may be founded on one of two broad categories: (1) a
"love and affection" insurable interest for persons closely related by blood
or affinity; and (2) for all other persons, "a lawful and substantial eco-
nomic interest in the continued life, health, and bodily safety of the per-
son insured."' 27 These insurable interest categories are discussed in more
detail below.
C. Necessary Parameters of The Insurable Interest Doctrine in
Life Insurance Contract Disputes
The insurable interest in life insurance is often interpreted by dividing life
insurance transactions into two general groups based upon "whether
(1) the policy is taken out by an insured on his or her own life or
(2) the policy is purchased by someone on the life of another person." 28
1. Insurable Interest in One's Own Life
It has often been stated that every person has an unlimited insurable in-
terest in his or her own life and may make payment to anyone he or
she pleases, whether the beneficiary has an insurable interest in that
24. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-3 (2008); ALASKA STAT. § 21-42-020 (2002); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 20-1104 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103 (2003); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10110.1 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-7-701 (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 2704
(2010); FLA. STAT. § 627.404 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3 (2006); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 33-59-2 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1804 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 304.15-010 (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:853 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
24-A, § 2404 (2009); MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 12-201 (2010); MINN. STAT. § 60A.078
(2009); Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-5-251 (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-201 (2009);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 3205(a)(1) (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-09.1(3) (2009); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 36 § 3604(C) (2010); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 27-4-27(c)(2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-4 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-301
(B) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.030(3) (2010); W.VA. CODE § 33-6-2(c) (2010);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-102(c) (2009).
25. BEST, supra note 13, Ch. 4:1, 80 81.
26. Id.; see, e.g., Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. McNabb, 825 F. Supp. 269 (D. Kan.
1993); Rubenstein v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y, 584 F. Supp. 272 (D. La. 1984); Foster v.
United Ins. Co. of Am., 158 S.E.2d 201 (S.C. 1967).
27. See Swisher, supra note 9, at 483 84; Martin, supra note 8, at 177 78. See, e.g., N.Y.
INS. LAW §§ 3205(a)(1)(A), (B) (2010).
28. KEETON & 'WIDISS, supra note 13, § 3.5(a) at 179; Swisher, supra note 9, at 484-85.
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person's life.2 9 The rationale for this general rule seems to be that the in-
sured normally wishes that his or her life will continue and is not inclined
to self-destruct for the sole purpose of bestowing a financial benefit on
others. 30
Likewise, it is assumed that the insured would not designate a person as
his or her beneficiary who is likely to murder the insured for the life in-
surance proceeds. 31 But, unfortunately, this does happen, and murder
committed by a life insurance beneficiary, sadly, is not uncommon. 32 In
such a situation, it is generally held that a beneficiary who intentionally
kills the insured cannot, and should not, recover the life insurance bene-
fits, and the proceeds should be paid instead to the innocent contingent
beneficiary or to the estate of the insured, based on the underlying ratio-
nale that it is contrary to state public policy, either under the common
law 3 3 or under a particular state's "slayer statute," 34 to permit a person
29. See generally BEST, supra note 13, Ch. 4:3, 83 85; VANCE & ANDERSON, supra note 13,
§ 31 at 188; Swisher, supra note 9, at 48 97; see, e.g., Mutual Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Noah, 282
So. 2d 271, 273 (Ala. 1973) (noting that "a person has an unlimited insurable interest in his
own life"); Pittsburgh Underwriters v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 27 A.2d 278, 280 (Pa.
Super Ct. 1942) ("It is elementary that everyone has an unlimited insurable interest in his
own life); Hoffman v. Fed. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 255 P. 980, 981 (Kan. 1927) (stating
that an "insured has an unlimited insurable interest in his own life"); Am. Cas. Co. v.
Rose, 340 F.2d 469, 471 (10th Ci. 1964) (applying Ohio law) (holding that the plaintiff
had an insurable interest in his own life and was free to "name anyone he saw fit as benefi-
ciary, regardless of whether the beneficiary had an insurable interest in the insured"); Round-
tree v. Frazee, 209 So. 2d 424, 436 (Ala. 1968) ((holding that an insurable interest is not nec-
essary to be an eligible beneficiary); Dodson v. Dodson, 825 S.W.608, 611 (Ark. Ct. App.
1992) (similar holding); Smith v. Coleman, 35 S.E.2d 107, 111 (Va. 1945) (similar holding).
30. See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 43, at 311 (3rd ed.
2002). There also is a suicide exclusion in most life insurance policies during the two-year
contestability period after the insured obtains his or her policy; see JEFFREY STEMPEL,
PETER SWISHER, & ERIK KNUTSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW, App. A at 1214 (4th ed.
2011).
31. See generally Swisher, supra note 9, at 487 97.
32. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 144 Cal. Rptr. 180, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Ford v.
Ford, 512 A.2d 389, 390 (Md. 1986); In re Barrett, 637 N.Y.S.2d 751, 752 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996); Dill v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 797 So. 2d 858, 859 (Miss. 2001); Wunsch
v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 92 S.W.3d 146, 155 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). See generally
F.S. Tinio, Annotation, Killing of Insured by Beneficiary as Affecting Life Insurance or Its Pro-
ceeds, 27 A.L.R. 3d 794 (1969 & Cum. Supp. 2014).
33. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Primofiore, 145 Cal. Rptr. 922, 926 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978) (stating that public policy requires that an individual not benefit from the unlawful
killing of another); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 363 N.E.2d 785, 786 (Ill. 1977)
(same rationale); Harper v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 662 P.2d 1264, 1269 (Kan.
1983) (same rationale).
34. See, e.g., Lunsford v. V. States Life Ins., 908 P.2d 79, 83 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (an-
alyzing Colorado's "slayer statute," which precludes a beneficiary of an insurance policy from
collecting the proceeds when the beneficiary kills the insured); Bennett v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
722 A.2d 115, 117 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (discussing New Jersey "slayer" law);
Wunsch v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 92 S.W.3d 146, 154 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (dis-
cussing and applying the Missouri "slayer statute").
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who has unlawfully killed another to benefit from his or her wrongdoing.
This rule applies to assignees of life insurance policies35 as well as to
beneficiaries.
In a life settlement context, the rule that every person has an unlimited
insurable interest in his or her own life is illustrated in the case of First
Penn-Pacific Life Insurance Company v. Evans.36 In this case, Moore, an Ar-
izona resident, "commenced a fraudulent scheme" by buying seven life in-
surance policies on his own life with a total face value of $8.5 million.
Within months he then sold these life insurance policies to a viatical set-
tlement broker after falsely claiming to be terminally ill.37 The insurance
company tried to have one of the policies declared void ab initio by claim-
ing that Moore did not have a bona fide insurable interest because he in-
tended to sell the policies to strangers at the time he applied for them. 38
The court held, however, that Moore did have an insurable interest in his
own life when he obtained the policies and because "[n]o third party par-
ticipated in the procurement of Moore's policy, and therefore no one was'wagering' on Moore's life in violation of public policy." 39
Professor Susan Lorde Martin has strongly criticized the holding of
Evans, writing: "[t]he [Evans] court rather outrageously refused to consider
[the insured's] subjective intent in evaluating insurable interest because
doing so 'would inject uncertainty into the secondary market for insur-
ance.' "40 "It is difficult to understand why the court assumed responsibility
to protect the life settlement industry. In doing so, the court is encouraging
life insurance scams.' 41 I believe that Professor Martin makes a valid point,
since a number of earlier and later cases have looked to the intent of the
parties as the basic test for determining the validity of a life insurance as-
signment.4 2 However, if there is no mutual intent of the parties at the
35. See, e.g., Equitable Life Ins. Soc'y v. Wightman, 160 P. 629, 632 (Okla. 1916) (finding
it "unquestionably the law that the assignee takes no greater interest than the assignor has");
Johnson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 100 S.E. 865, 866 (W.Va. 1919) (stating that the assignees of
a beneficiary cannot "stand on any higher ground than the beneficiary herself."); see generally
infra Part I.D.
36. First Penn-Pac. Life Ins. Co. v. Evans (4th Cir. 2009) (applying Ariz. law).
37. Id. at 634-35.
38. Id. at 635. The insurer's argument was largely based on the earlier precedential au-
thority of Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 781 (1881) and Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149,
156 (1911), both holding that a preconceived intent to assign a life insurance policy to
one without an insurable interest, who thereafter pays the premiums, may be open to ques-
tion as a wagering contract. See generally infra an extended discussion under Part I.D.
39. Evans, 313 F. App'x at 636; see also Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Paulson, 2008
YVL 5112 0953 (D. Minn. 2008) (similar holding).
40. Id. at 636.
41. Martin, supra note 8, at 205 16, 211.
42. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Rawlings, 79 A. 915, 916 17 (Md. 1911); Volunteer Life Ins.
Co. v. Buchanan, 73 S.E. 602, 604 (Ga. Ct. App. 1912); Oleska v. Kotur, 48 N.E.2d 88,
94 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 1943); see generally C.T. Dreschler, Annotation, Validity of Assignment
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time the policy is procured to circumvent the insurable interest require-
ment, the insurance company may raise alternate defenses of breach of con-
tract, fraud, and tortious misrepresentation. 43
Another notorious life settlement case where the insured apparently
had an "unlimited insurable interest" in his own life is Kramer v. Phoenix
Life Insurance Company.44 In Kramer, the insured Arthur Kramer, a prom-
inent New York attorney, purchased several life insurance policies on his
own life, allegedly with the intent of immediately assigning the beneficial
interests to investors who lacked an insurable interest in his life. 4 These
life insurance policies collectively provided $56,200,000 in coverage. 46
When Kramer died, his widow, as personal representative of her deceased
husband's estate, brought an action against the various life insurance com-
panies, trustees, insurance brokers, and "stranger" life settlement inves-
tors, seeking to have the policy proceeds paid to her instead, as
Kramer's beneficiary. 47
The New York Court of Appeals stressed the distinction of when one
insures his or her own life, compared to when a third party insures the life
of another:
When one insures his or her own life, the wagering aspect is overridden by
the recognized social utility of the contract as an investment to benefit oth-
ers. When a third party insurers another's life, however, the contract does not
have the same manifest utility and assumes more speculative characteristics
which may subject it to the same general condemnation as wagers.48
of Life Insurance Policy to One Who Has No Insurable Interest in Insured, 30 A.L.R.2d 1310, § 30
(1953 & Cum. Supp. 2013); see also AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp. LLC,
608 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (applying Fla. law) (holding contra to the Evans case
regarding the intention of the parties in a life settlement contract dispute); PHL Variable Ins.
Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A3d 1059 (Del. 2011) (holding that an insured's right
to take out a life insurance policy with the intent to immediately transfer that policy is not
unqualified, and that right is limited to a bona fide sale of a life insurance policy taken out in
good faith).
43. See generally infra Part III.C.2. But see also Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596
F. Supp. 2d 882, 890 (D. NJ. 2009) (finding that a unilateral fraudulent intent of the insured
was sufficient in alleging an insurable interest challenge) (emphasis added).
44. Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 914 N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y. 2010).
45. N.Y. IN. LAW § 3205(b)(1) addresses individuals obtaining life insurance on their own
lives: "Any person of lawful age may on his own initiative procure or effect a contract of in-
surance upon his own person for the benefit of any person, firm, association, or corporation.
Nothing herein shall be deemed to prohibit the immediate transfer or assignment of a con-
tract so procured or effectuated" Id. at 713.
46. This is not a typo or a misprint. We are talking about insurance policies on Kramer's
life totaling $56 million.
47. Id. at 712. In most jurisdictions, however, the rights of an assignee are superior to the
rights of a beneficiary. See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 13, § 52B(d)(1) at 342 ("Most
courts treat the assignee's rights as superior to those of the beneficiary").
48. Id. at 713 14 (citing with approval New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Caruso, 538
N.Y.S.2d 217 (1989) (emphasis added).
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The Kramer majority concluded that
New York law permits a person to procure an insurance policy on his or her
own life and immediately transfer it to one without an insurable interest in
that life, even where the policy was obtained for just such a purpose....
We recognize the importance of the insurable interest doctrine in differen-
tiating between insurance policies and mere wagers [citation omitted] and
there is some tension between the law's distaste for wager policies and its
sanctioning an insured's procurement of a policy on his or her own life for
the purpose of selling it. It is not our role, however, to engraft an intent
or good faith requirement.49
One commentator, Douglas Richmond, asks
[w]hy should it matter whether the insured acquired the policy in good faith
adherence to the insurable interest requirement rather than as an attempt to
circumvent it as in Kramer? For that matter, so long as Kramer did not mis-
represent his intentions on the policy applications, arguably he was not at-
tempting to circumvent the insurable interest requirement. To the contrary,
he passed the insurable interest test but simply deployed his policies in a
fashion the insurers disliked.50
With all due respect, I strongly disagree. First, I question whether
Kramer "did not misrepresent his intentions on the policy applications."
I think he probably did."1 And second, I agree with the dissenting judge in
Kramer that the strong common law public policy rationale preventing
wagering contracts in life insurance policies has become so firmly estab-
lished in American life insurance jurisprudence, that it has not been
49. Id. at 710 11.
50. Richmond, supra note 14, at 684.
51. Life insurance applications frequently ask questions regarding the applicant's intent in
taking out the policy. For example, the following questions are excerpted from a John Han-
cock life insurance application:
4(a) Is there, or will there be an understanding or agreement providing for a party, other
than the Owner designated in the Application, to obtain any right, title, or other legal or
beneficial interest in any policy issued on the life of the Proposed Life Insured as a result of
the application? . . . (c) will the premiums, now or in the future, be funded by a loan or
other means from someone other than the Insured or the Insured's employer?
Most life insurance companies have incorporated similar questions in their policy applica-
tions in an effort to avoid STOLI policies. See, e.g., Buechner, supra note 7, at 8 n.26. If
an applicant answered these questions incorrectly, this would constitute fraud and material
misrepresentation on the part of the applicant that would render the policy void ab initio;
see also Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Doris Barnes Family 2008 Irrevocable Trust,
2011 NVL 759554, at * 1 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ("Hartford, in an effort to avoid STOLI policies,
includes certain questions on its life insurance application related to 'whether the insured or
proposed owner has discussed selling the policy or an interest in the policy, whether the pre-
mium payments are being financed either directly or indirectly [by a third party], and
whether financial incentives have been offered to the insured or proposed owner of the pol-
icy.' Each of the questions in the Barnes' application were answered in the negative.").
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"displaced" by New York Insurance Law Section 3205(b), 2 as I will dis-
cuss more fully below.5 3 The Kramer case became moot, however, in May
2010 when the New York state legislature passed new statutes further reg-
ulating life settlements in New York.54
2. Insurable Interest Requirement in the Life of Another
Although the language found in state judicial opinions and state statutes
as to what constitutes a valid insurable interest in the life of another varies
from state to state, there is nevertheless a general consensus that an insur-
able interest in the life of another may be founded on one of two broad
categories: (1) a family "love and affection" insurable interest for persons
closely related by blood and affinity; and (2) for all other persons "a lawful
and substantial economic interest" in the continued life, health, and
bodily safety of the person insured.55 A crucial requirement for either cat-
egory, however, is that to have an insurable interest in another person's
life, the owner of a life insurance policy must reasonably expect to receive
a pecuniary gain from the insured's continued life or suffer financial loss
as a result of the insured's death.5 6
a. Close Family "Love and Affection" Insurable Interest-Traditionally,
each spouse in a life insurance contract is considered to have a "love
and affection" insurable interest in the life of the other spouse,5 7 and
this "love and affection" insurable interest applies with equal force to a
parent and child relationship.5 8 Most other family relationships, however,
have required a concomitant economic dependency or a pecuniary
interest in the prolonged life of the insured to establish a valid insurable
interest in the life of an extended family member.5 9
52. See supra note 50.
53. See generally infra the discussion in Part I.D.
54. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 7813(j)(1) (2010) which provides in relevant part: "No per-
son, at any time prior to, or at the time of, the application for, or insurance of, a policy, or
during the two-year period commencing with the date of insurance of the policy, shall enter
into a life settlement contract, regardless of the date the compensation is to be provided and
regardless of the date the assignment, transfer, sale, devise or bequest of the policy is to
cover."1
55. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Hillaird v. Jacobs, 874 N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
57. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Hopkins, 614 A.2d 96, 99 (Md. 1992); Meechan v. Transam. Oc-
cidental Life Ins. Co., 499 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986); Jennings v. Jennings, 33
So. 2d 251, 253 (Ala. 1948); see generally JOHN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 802 (2d ed. 1966).
58. See, e.g., Mutual Say. Life Ins. v. Noah, 282 So. 2d 271, 274 (Ala. 1973) ("It is gener-
ally held that a parent, because of the close ties of blood, has an insurable interest in the life
of a child, and vice versa"); Dixon v. W. Union Assurance Co., 164 S.E.2d 214, 218 (S.C.
1968) (similar holding); N. River Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 481 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972) (similar holding); see generally APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 58, § 791.
59. See, e.g., Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So. 2d 696, 704 (Ala. 1957) (hold-
ing that for an aunt to have an insurable interest in the life of her niece, she needed to show a
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b. "Lawful and Substantial Economic Interest" Requirement-If no close
familial "love and affection" insurable interest in the life of another family
member exists, a person insuring the life of another generally must have a
"lawful and substantial economic interest in the continued life, health, and
bodily safety of the person insured" in order to prevent illegal wagering
contracts. 60
This "substantial economic interest" insurable interest requirement in
the life of another is generally found in certain business relationships, in-
cluding: (1) an economic interest of one business partner in the life of an-
other;6 1 (2) an economic interest of a business entity in the life of a "key"
employee;6 2 and (3) a creditor's economic insurable interest in the life of
his or her debtor, at least up to the amount of the debt.63 Finally, there
may be other business or commercial interests based upon certain con-
tractual obligations between the parties, where the death of an individual
"reasonable expectation of possible profit or advantage to her from the continued life of [her
niece]"); People's First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Christ, 65 A.2d 393, 395 (Pa. 1949) (de-
manding more than a mere familial relationship for an aunt and uncle to procure life insur-
ance on the life of a nephew); see generally Swisher, supra note 9, at 498 510.
60. See, e.g., Rubenstein v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 584 F. Supp. 272, 278 (E.D. La.
1984) ("A beneficiary who is not related by blood or marriage to the insured does not have an
insurable interest unless he has a reasonable expectation of pecuniary gain from the contin-
ued life of the insured, or a [a] reasonable expectation of sustaining loss from his death").
61. See, e.g., Graves v. Norred, 510 So. 2d 816, 818 (Ala. 1987) (holding that a business
partner had an insurable interest in the life of another partner); Ridley v. VanderBoegh,
511 P.2d 273, 279 80 (Idaho 1973) (similar holding).
62. The relationship of an employer and an employee in itself is not sufficient to give an
employer a valid insurable interest in the life of its employee. Rather, an employer must have
a reasonable expectation of a substantial pecuniary gain through the continued life of the em-
ployee, or a substantial pecuniary loss in case of the employee's death, to sustain a valid and
enforceable insurable interest in such a "key man" or "key woman" employee. See, e.g., Mayo
v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 400, 407 (5th Cir. 2004); see generally LEE Russ & THO
MAS SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 43:13 (3d ed. 1997). Thus, an employer would have an
insurable interest only "in the lives of its employees who are crucial to the operation of the
employer's business enterprise," such as the life of its key corporate officers, directors, or
managers, whose death would have a substantial negative economic effect on the overall
business enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S.
189, 195 (1924) (company president); Chapman v. Lipscomb-Ellis Co., 22 S.E.2d 393,
398 99 (Ga. 1942) (corporate officer and shareholder); Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Board Arm-
strong & Co., 80 S.E. 565, 567 (Va. 1914) (company president and general manager). But
see also Tillman v. Camelot Music Co., 408 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 2005) (applying
Okla. law) (holding that an employer did not have an insurable interest in the life of a
rank-and-file employee); Annotation, Insurance on Life of Officer for Benefit of Private Corpora-
tion 143 A.L.R. 293 (1943).
63. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 326, 334 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that a creditor's insurable interest in the life of the debtor is limited to the
amount of debt, plus premiums paid, plus interest); see also Crotty v. Union Mut. Life Ins.
Co. 144 U.S. 621, 623 24 (1891) (similar holding); Bank Credit Life Ins. Co., v. Pine
Bluff Nat'l Bank, 448 S.W.2d 333, 334 35 (Ark. 1969) (similar holding); see generally APPLE
MAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 58, §§ 851 59; VANCE & ANDERSON, supra note 13, § 32;
Swisher, supra note 9, at 510 22.
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arguably would cause a substantial economic loss to another in the fulfill-
ment of a specified contractual arrangement. 64
Thus, any insurable interest in the life of another that is not related to
a close family "love and affection" insurable interest must be supported
by a lawful and substantial economic interest in the continued life and
health of the person insured, or the life insurance contract will be de-
clared null and void because it would constitute an illegal wagering
contract.
3. When an Insurable Interest in the Life of Another Must Exist
Most courts and commentators agree that because property insurance
generally is characterized as indemnity insurance, 6 if there is no insurable
interest in the property at the time of loss, there is no insurable loss, due
to the lack of a valid insurable interest in the property. 66 However, life in-
surance has been characterized as an investment contract rather than as a
contract of indemnity, although one could make a strong argument that
business-related life insurance, such as partnership life insurance policies,
"key employee" life insurance, and creditor-debtor life insurance policies
also may be characterized in the nature of indemnity insurance as well as a
contractual investment in the life of another.67
Nevertheless, the prevailing view, held by a vast majority of courts and
commentators today, is that an insurable interest in the life of another
need only exist at the time of the policy inception and not at the time
of the insured's death. 68 However, there is also a minority rule that re-
64. See, e.g., Beard v. Am. Agency Life Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 677, 681 83 (Md. 1988) (involv-
ing a contractual option for the purchase and sale of property); Theatre Guild Prods. Inc. v.
Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 267 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 300 (App. Div. 1966), affirmed, 278 N.Y.S.2d
625 (N.Y. 1966) (holding that the producer of a play had an insurable interest in the play's
star actress, covering her illness, death, or disability, and indemnifying the producer against
financial loss resulting from her inability to perform).
65. Under the insurance doctrine of indemnity, an insured may recover only the amount
of his or her actual loss and nothing more. See, e.g., KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 13, § 3.1 (a)
at 135.
66. See, e.g., Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 292 F. Supp. 947, 951 (S.D. Iowa 1968); Ins.
Co. of N. Am. v. Sealbord Homes Inc., 273 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (Sup. Ct. 1965); see generally
KEETON& WIDISS, supra note 13, § 3.3(b)(2) at 154; VANCE & ANDERSON, supra note 13, § 30
at 180.
67. I made this argument in a previous law review article. See Swisher, supra note 9, at
522 31.
68. See, e.g., Hilliard v. Jacobs, 874 N.E.2d 1060, 1064-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); In re Es-
tate of D'Agostino, 139 P.3d 1125, 1128 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); Herman v. Provident Mut.
Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 886 F.2d 529, 533 34 (2nd Cir. 1989) (applying N.Y. law);
Trent v. Parker, 591 S.W.2d 769, 770 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); see generally KEETON &
WVIDISS, supra note 13, § 3.3(b)(1) at 151 (stating the general rule that a life insurance contract
is enforceable, regardless of whether this insurable interest exists at the time of death); JERRY
& RICHMOND, supra note 13, § 44(b) at 284-85.
718 Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal, Spring-Summer 2015 (50:3&4)
quires an insurable interest in the life of another to exist both at the incep-
tion of the policy and at the time of the insured's death.6 9
Professor Edwin Patterson tells us that originally the courts did require
that an insurable interest in the life of another must exist both at the in-
ception of the life insurance contract and at the time of the insured's
death, or the life insurance policy would be unenforceable as soon as
the insurable interest was extinguished. 70 However, the insurers "did
not take advantage of this ruling: they continued to pay the full amount
of the [life insurance] policy, although the [insurable] interest had been
extinguished." In short, "life insurance custom conquered the law." 71
4. Incontestability Provisions Versus Lack of an Insurable Interest
in Life Insurance Contracts
Life settlement companies, investors, and other speculators in life insur-
ance policies who do not have an insurable interest in the life of the in-
sured often use incontestability clauses in the life insurance policy to pro-
tect their investments, even if the insured has been guilty of fraudulent
misrepresentation in the insurance application. 72 By statute, forty-seven
of the fifty states require incontestability clauses in individual life insur-
ance policies73 that prevent insurers from raising stale defenses to cover-
age after two years and make life insurance a more reliable form of invest-
ment, in that beneficiaries can rely upon its existence after the two-year
contestability period expires, except for nonpayment of premiums. 74
69. See, e.g., Allen v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tex. Civ. App.
2007) (holding that the beneficiary of a life insurance policy must have an insurable interest
in the insured's life when the policy is issued and when the insured dies. "Two policies guide
this rule: A practice that encourages one to take another's life should be prohibited, and no
one should be permitted to wager on the life of another"); see also William T. Vulowich, In-
surable Interest: When It Must Exist in Property and Life Insurance, 7 WILLAMETTE LJ. 1, 38
(1971):
The rule requiring an insurable interest both at the inception of the policy and at death
would probably provide a greater deterrence against homicide. An ex-creditor and an
ex-spouse receive no advantage by the continued life of the ex-debtor and ex-spouse; on
the contrary, they would profit by their early deaths. Considering that there is substantial
evidence that insurance often provides a motive for homicide, even in cases where the pol-
icy owner has an insurable interest, such a rule would possibly be desirable.
Id.
70. See, e.g., Godsall v. Boldero, 9 East 72 (1807) (holding that where a creditor of Wil-
liam Pitt insured Pitt's life, he was denied any claim to the insurance proceeds on Pitt's
death, since the debt had already been paid).
71. Patterson, supra note 13, 162 66, 163.
72. See Richmond, supra note 14, at 678 80.
73. See, e.g., Sun Life Ins. Co. of Canada v. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d 728, 731 32 (D. Del.
2011).
74. See Richmond, supra note 14, at 678 80.
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An incontestability provision, however, generally provides no defense
to the claim that a life insurance policy is void ab initio based upon the
lack of a bona fide insurable interest.7' For example, in the case of Sun
Life Assurance Company of Canada v. Berck,76 the court held that under Del-
aware law, an insurer was entitled to contest the validity of a STOLI life
insurance policy on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation, allegedly
rendering the policy void ab initio based upon the lack of a bona fide in-
surable interest, even after the expiration of a two-year incontestability
period provided by statute because public policy and a majority of case
law supported this determination. 77
Thus, due to the crucial underlying public policy importance of an
insurable interest requirement in the life of another in order to prevent
wagering contracts, and in order to prevent the unwelcome possibility
of homicide, the vast majority of American courts currently hold that
the insurable interest requirement on the life of another is not subject
to incontestability provisions 7s nor to any defenses of waiver or estop-
pel. 7 9 Moreover, most courts follow the general view that only the
75. See, e.g., Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Fima, 105 F.3d 490, 492 (9th Cir. 1997) (apply-
ing Cal. law) ("California law provides that a policy which is void ab initio may be contested
at any time, even after the incontestability period has expired"); Beard v. Am. Agency Life
Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 667, 689 (Md. 1988) (finding that an incontestability clause does not
apply to an insurance policy that is void ab initio because "the invocation of an incontestabil-
ity provision presupposes a basically valid contract").
There is a minority "New York" approach, holding that a state incontestability statute
would also apply to a lack of an insurable interest claim. See, e.g., New Eng. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Caruso, 535 N.E.2d 270, 272 75 (N.Y. 1989); see also Bogacki v. Great West
Life Assur. Co., 234 N.W. 865,866 (Mich. 1931) (similar holding). The overwhelming ma-
jority of other states, however, do not recognize this questionable "New York" approach,
based upon a strong public policy rationale against wagering contracts in life insurance.
See generally the related discussion in Part I of this article.
76. 770 F. Supp. 2d 728 (D. Del. 2011).
77. Id. at 732 34, citing with approval 'Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881);
Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 154 (1911); Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Paulson,
2008 NVL 451054, at * 2 (D. Minn. 2008); N. Am. Co. for Life and Health Ins. v. Lewis, 535
F. Supp. 2d 755, 759 (S.D. Miss. 2008); Herman v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Phila-
delphia, 886 F.2d 529, 534 (2d Cir. 1989); see also PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Price Dawe
2006 Insurance Trust, 28 A.3d 1059 (Del. 2011) (similar holding).
78. See MARTINEZ ET AL., supra note 13, § 34.09(3)(e) at 34-28, 29:
Most states have statutory incontestability periods that do not have exceptions for fraud
[citation omitted]. Thus, one might conclude that after the contestability period ends
the policy is incontestable and insurers would not be able to attack viatical or STOLI
transactions. Such a conclusion would be in error in most jurisdictions. Courts routinely
permit inquiry after the incontestability date has passed into whether there was an insur-
able interest at the inception of the policy ...
Id.
79. See, e.g., Beard v. Am. Agency Life Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 677, 688 (Md. 1988); see also
Colver v. Cent. States Fire Ins. Co., 287 P. 266, 268 (Kan. 1930); Natl'l Life & Accident
Ins. Co. v. Ball, 127 So. 268, 268 (Miss. 1930); Swisher, supra note 9, at 537:
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insurer has standing to raise the lack of an insurable interest in life
insurance. 80
Troubling questions nevertheless continue to exist within this general
doctrine. As I have queried in a previous law review article:
Is it fair, on one hand, for a life insurance company or its agent to insure the
life of another and accept multiple premium payments over the years, know-
ing that the policy owner does not have a valid insurable interest in the life of
the insured? Yet, on the other hand, without a bona fide insurable interest, is
not such a policy a wagering contract, pure and simple, which is void at its
inception, regardless of the parties' good faith? How might we resolve this
doctrinal conundrum? 1
Some courts, admittedly a minority, have carved out an exception to
the general rule that an insurer cannot waive, or be estopped to
assert, the insurable interest doctrine whenever the insurer or its agent
writing the policy knew that the person obtaining insurance lacked an in-
surable interest in the insured person or property but wrote the policy
anyway. 82 A second viable remedy against an insurer, however, would
sound in tort-for negligently issuing a life insurance policy to someone
who lacked a bona fide insurable interest in the life of another.83
In the context of life settlement arrangements, Professor Martin writes:
Life settlement companies know they are acting illegally when they participate
in STOLI schemes; they and their investors should not benefit from their
involvement. The insured should not be able to have it both ways: getting
Due to the crucial underlying public policy importance of an insurable interest require-
ment in the life of another in order to prevent wagering contracts, and in order to prevent
the unwelcome, but very real, possibility of homicide, the vast majority of American courts
and commentators have held that the insurable interest requirement on the life of another
is not subject to the defenses of waiver or estoppel. (footnotes omitted)
80. See, e.g., In re Estate of D'Agostino, 139 P.3d 1125, 1130 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); Ryan
v. Tickle, 316 N.V.2d 580, 582 83 (Neb. 1982).
81. Swisher, supra note 9, at 539.
82. See, e.g., Rogers v. Atl. Life Ins. Co., 133 S.E. 215, 220 (S.C. 1926) (life insurance);
Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hester, 298 So.2d 236, 243 44 (Ala. 1974) (fire insurance). Pro-
fessor Robert Jerry notes that: "[These cases] and others like [them] are good candidates for
recognizing an exception to the general rule that the insurer cannot waive or be estopped to
assert the insurable interest doctrine, but not all cases follow this approach, even when the
agent disregards information showing lack of an insurable interest." JERRY, supra note 30,
§ 45 at 321.
83. See, e.g., Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So. 2d 696, 708 (Ala. 1957) (hold-
ing that a life insurance company has "the duty to use reasonable care not to issue a policy of
life insurance in favor of a beneficiary who has no interest in the continuation of the life of
another"); see generally Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Insurer's Tort Liability for Wrong-
ful or Negligent Issuance of Life Policy, 37 A.L.R.4th 972 (1985 & 2014 Cum. Supp.) (discussing
circumstances in which life insurance companies can be held liable in tort for negligently is-
suing a life insurance policy to one without a valid insurable interest in the life of another).
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money while alive from a life settlement company in exchange for illegally
buying life insurance policies for them, and, if that does not work out for
the investors, then the insured's heirs will get the proceeds from the
policies-a win-win situation for participating in an illegal scheme. The insur-
ance company should have to forfeit premiums collected if they failed to per-
form due diligence in writing policies where there is no insurable interest.8 4
A number of courts, however, have held the opposite. For example, in
Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company v. GreatBanc Trust Company,85 all
the parties agreed that a STOLI scheme was void ab initio because it
was procured through material misrepresentation and in the absence of
a valid insurable interest. The investors requested a return of their pre-
mium payments. The federal district court, however, applying Illinois
law, held that the equitable remedy of rescission did not apply in this par-
ticular case because, in the absence of a valid insurable interest, there was
no valid contract to rescind. 86 "[I]n the case of illegal contracts the courts
would not, on one hand, undo what has been done, nor on the other, per-
fect what has been left unfinished," and therefore the court "will leave the
parties ... where they have placed themselves" with the insurance com-
pany keeping the premium payments. 87 While I agree with the legal anal-
ysis of the Greenbanc Trust court, it should still be noted that the insurance
company, while arguably retaining the premiums, may also be liable in a
concomitant tort action for failing to perform reasonable diligence in
writing life insurance policies where there is no bona fide insurable inter-
est in the life of another. 88
D. Assignment of Life Insurance Policies to One Who Lacks an Insurable
Interest in the Life of Another
Should the owner of a life insurance policy be able to assign the policy to
one who lacks an insurable interest in the life of the insured? This is a cru-
cial question for life settlement providers and investors when applied to
84. Martin, supra note 8, at 209.
85. Penn Mut. Ins. Co. v. Greatbanc Trust Co., 887 F. Supp. 2d 822 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
86. Id. at 827 28.
87. Id. at 830 31. The court distinguished the case of Principal Life Insurance Co. v. Law-
rence Rucker 2007 Insurance Trust, 774 F. Supp. 2d 674 (D. Del. 2011), where the court held
that, under Delaware law, the insurer could not retain the premiums from an illegal STOLI
scheme. But in Rucker, "[a]lthough the court had declared the [STOLI] policy void ab initio,
it nevertheless (and without explanation) went on to rely on rescission cases for the propo-
sition that the insurer could not elect both rescission and retention of premiums." Id. at 829
30; see also PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Lucille Morello 2007 Irrevocable Trust, 645 F.3d 965,
969 70 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying Minn. Law) (also recognizing the insurance company's
right to retain the premiums paid on a fraudulently procured STOLI policy); see generally
infra Part III.D.
88. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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viaticals, life settlements, and STOLI transactions, all of which involve
stranger-owned life insurance.
Until the early part of the twentieth century, state courts were divided
on whether an insured could assign his or her life insurance policy to a
third party stranger who lacked any insurable interest in the life of the
insured. Some courts held that such an assignment was invalid, even in
the absence of any bad faith and even in the absence of any intention
to assign at the time of the policy issuance. 89 Other courts, however,
treated an assignment of a life insurance policy to one who lacked an in-
surable interest as a valid chose in action, as long as it was not intended to
circumvent the law. 90
Two highly influential Supreme Court cases subsequently clarified and
"institutionalized" the law of life insurance assignments: Warnock v.
Davis91 and Grigsby v. Russell.9 2 In Warnock, the insured entered into an
agreement with an association that he would procure insurance on his
life and then immediately assign his life insurance policy to the associa-
tion, which would pay all the premiums and receive nine-tenths of the
policy proceeds on the insured's death. The Supreme Court held the in-
sured's preconceived intent to assign his policy to the association was void
as against public policy because to hold it valid "would be to sanction
speculative risks on human life and encourage the evils for which wager
policies are condemned. '9 3
In Grigsby v. Russell, the insured, John Burchard, being in need of
money for a surgical operation, sold his life insurance policy to Dr.
Grigsby for $100 and Grigsby's undertaking to pay the premiums due
or to become due. 94 Justice Holmes, writing the opinion for the Court,
held this assignment was valid. "[L]ife insurance has become in our
days one of the best recognized forms of investment and self-compelled
savings," he stated. "So far as reasonable safety permits, it is desirable
to give to life policies the ordinary characteristics of property [as a
chose in action]" 9' But Justice Holmes also cited Warnock and warned
89. See, e.g., Ala. Gold Life Ins. Co., v. Mobile Mut. Ins. Co., 1 So. 561, 563 65 (Ala.
1886); Mo. Valley Life Ins. v. McCrum, 12 P. 517, 518 19 (Kan. 1887); Barbour's v. Larne's
Assignee, 51 S.W. 5, 7 9 (Ky. 1899); Schonfield v. Turner, 12 S.W. 626, 626 27 (Tex. 1889).
90. See, e.g., Page v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 135 S.A. 911, 912 (Ark. 1911); Curtiss v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 27 P. 211, 214 (Cal. 1891); Bloomington Mut. Ben. Assoc. v. Blue, 11 N.E.
331, 332 33 (1887); Rittler v. Smith, 16 A. 890, 891 93 (Md. 1889); Dixon v. Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 46 N.E. 430, 430 31 (Mass. 1897); McDonald v. Birss, 58 N.W. 359, 360
(Mich. 1894); Brett v. 'Warnick, 75 P. 1061, 1064-65 (Or. 1904); Clement v. N.Y. Life
Ins. Co., 46 S.W. 561, 564-65 (1898); Hurd v. Doty, 56 N.Y. 371, 373 75 (Wis. 1893).
91. 104 U.S. 775 (1882).
92. 222 U.S. 149 (1911).
93. Warnock, 104 U.S. at 777.
94. Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 154. This case could be referred to as "America's first viatical."
95. Id. at 156.
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against any preconceived assignment to a third-party stranger, which
would still constitute an illegal wagering contract.96 Consequently,
since the Court decided the case of Erie v. Tompkins in 1938, 9 7 where fed-
eral courts must now apply substantive state law to decide the validity of
an assignment of a life insurance policy, an overwhelming majority of
state courts have now recognized and incorporated the Warnock and
Grigsby decisions into their own common law jurisprudence. 98 Therefore,
as Franklin L. Best concludes on the assignability of life insurance
contacts:
An assignment [of a life insurance policy] to one without [an] insurable inter-
est who thereafter pays the premiums may be open to question as a wager,
but the tendency of the decisions seems to be to allow assignments by the
insured to anyone, irrespective of who subsequently pays the premiums, so
long as the policy was taken out in good faith and was not at its inception a
wagering transaction. This is justified on the ground that the policy is prop-
erty, a chose in action, and should be freely transferable as far as reasonable
safety permits.99
This is the general rule for life settlement assignments as well.1° ° Put an-
other way, an insured must obtain a life insurance policy "on his own ini-
tiative" and in good faith, that is, with a genuine intent to obtain life
insurance protection for a family member, loved one, or business partner
in order to validly assign the policy to someone else who does not have an
insurable interest in his life.1"1 This would normally constitute a valid
96. Id. at 156 157.
97. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
98. See, e.g., Chapman v. Lipscomb-Ellis Co., 22 S.E.2d 393, 395 98, 143 A.L.R. 286
(Ga. 1942); Gray v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 126 N.E.2d 409, 414-15 (Ill. Ct. App.
1955); Elliot v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 64 N.E.2d 911,917 (Ind. Ct. App. 1946); Peel v. Reibel,
286 N.W. 345,346 (Minn. 1939); Schneider v. Kohler, 201 S.W.2d 499, 502 (Mo. Ct. App.
1947); Thompson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 67 S.E.2d 444, 446-47 (N.C. 1951); Hammers v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co., 216 S.W.2d 703, 704 05 (Tenn. 1948); see generally Annotation, Va-
lidity of Assignment of Life Insurance Policy to One Who Has No Insurable Interest in Insured, 30 A.
L.R. 2d 1310, § 16 (1953 & 2013 Cum. Supp.).
99. BEST, supra note 13, ch. 4:4 at 86 (emphasis added).
100. See, e.g., Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Moran, 2009 VL 2450443 (D. Ariz. 2009);
Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Doris Barnes Family 2008 Irrevocable Trust, 2011 VL
759554 (C.D. Cal. 2011); PHL Variable Ins. Co., v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust, 28
A.3d 1059 (Del. 2011); Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d 728
(D. Del. 2011); Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Goldstein, 741 F. Supp. 2d 604 (D. Del. 2010);
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D. NJ. 2009); PHL Variable
Life Ins. Co. v. Robert Gelb Irrevocable Trust, 2010 NVL 4363377 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Sciaretta
v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co, 899 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2012); TTSI Irrevocable Trust
v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co. 60 So.3d 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); AXA Equitable Life Ins.
Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp. LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (applying Fla. law);
Principal Life Ins. Co. v. DeRose, 2011 YVL 4738114 (M.D. Penn. 2011).
101. See, e.g., Life Prod. Clearing LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646, 653 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
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assignment, then, for viaticals and life settlements, 10 2 when an insured is
trying to sell an existing life insurance policy on the secondary market that
is no longer needed, wanted, or affordable.
However, a life insurance policy, such as various STOLI schemes
today, 10 3 obtained when there is a preconceived intent by the parties at
the time of the policy inception to assign it to a third party stranger
would constitute a void ab initio wagering contract.10 4 This is because
STOLI schemes are more than stranger-owned life insurance on the sec-
ondary market. They are stranger-originated life insurance and, as such,
are void ab initio as illegal wagering contracts.
In conclusion, the insurable interest requirement for life insurance is
well-recognized and well-entrenched in American jurisprudence, and it
continues to serve an important and viable public policy function in pro-
hibiting void ab initio wagering contracts in the lives of others. Contrary
to the arguments of some of its critics,105 the insurable interest require-
ment for life insurance has long been validated and enforced by state stat-
utes and judicial opinions in almost every state, 106 and the doctrine of life
insurance assignments 10 7 applies with equal force to the life settlement in-
dustry as well. 1 8 Viewed in this context, therefore, "the insurable interest
requirement emerges as a relevant, powerful tool to combat unsavory life
insurance practices" in the secondary insurance market.109
Abandoning the insurable interest requirement and leaving securitized
life settlement contracts to the unregulated whims of Wall Street inves-
tors and other speculators seems both foolish and unrealistic-similar
to the subprime mortgage fiasco of the past decade. In short, the demise
of the insurable interest requirement for life insurance has been greatly
exaggerated. It is an ancient doctrine that has found new relevance in pro-
tecting policyholders and insurers in the secondary life insurance market.
II. VIACTICALS AND LIFE SETTLEMENTS
A. What are Viaticals and Life Settlements?
The development of the life settlement industry began with the AIDS
epidemic in the late 1980s. At that time, HIV/AIDS victims required con-
tinuous end-of-life medical and care giving treatment, and their chances
102. See generally infra Part II.
103. See, e.g., infra Part III.
104. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 653 54; see also Bloink, supra note 14, at 65 67.
105. See, e.g., Loshin, supra note 13.
106. See supra notes 20 27 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 89 90 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 100 104 and accompanying text.
109. Bloink, supra note 14, at 57.
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of survival were minimal, even with access to top quality medical care. A
viatical settlement 1 therefore allowed a policyholder who had con-
tracted HIV/AIDS-or another terminal disease-to sell his or her inter-
est in a life insurance policy to a third party life settlement provider (LSP)
and associated investors for a sum that was more than the cash surrender
value, but less than the policy's death benefit. The third party investors
continue to pay the policy premiums until the death of the insured and
collect the policy's resulting death benefit.1 11
The viatical settlement market subsequently expanded to include other
terminal illnesses, especially since AIDS became a more treatable disease.
Thus, people suffering from cancer, heart disease, Alzheimer's disease,
and other progressive illnesses, as well as elderly people in need of
funds for assisted living, found viatical settlements to be a useful source
of immediate cash. Today, the life settlement industry "is growing expo-
nentially as investors seek out not only the terminally ill, but the swelling
ranks of generally healthy, elderly Americans."11 2 Indeed, investors in the
viatical and life settlement market now include institutional investors such
as Merrill Lynch, Lloyds of London, Citibank, CNA, Deutsche Bank, GE
Capital, AIG, Zurich, Gen Re (a former unit of Berkshire Hathaway),
Bank of New York, Maple Financial, and U.S. Bank & Trust.1 13
According to one often-quoted study, a viatical policy generally is less
than $100,000, and the policyholder typically is an AIDS patient, or an-
other terminally ill person, whose life expectancy is less than two years
and usually twelve months or less. A life settlement policy, on the other
hand, typically is more than $100,000 and usually over $250,000. Life set-
tlement policyholders are normally citizens over sixty-five years of age,
frequently (but not always) with impaired health, and with life expectan-
cies as high as twelve to fifteen years. 114
110. A viaticum in ancient Rome was a purse containing money and provisions for a jour-
ney. A viatical settlement, by which a dying person is able to acquire provisions for the re-
mainder of his life's journey by selling his life insurance policy, is thus thought to provide a
viaticum. See Life Partners Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 286 87 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying
Va. law).
111. See generally Matthews, supra note 14, at 523 27; Bloink, supra note 14, at 76 79;
Martin, supra note 8, at 184-87.
112. See Life Partners Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying Va.
law).
113. Kohli, supra note 3, at 286 n. 27. "Consequently, there has been less fraud in the life
settlement market when compared to the viatical settlement market because institutional
investors perform a much higher level of due diligence before making an investment." Id.
at 286.
114. See Deloitte Consulting LLP, The Life Settlements Market, supra note 7, at 3. Com-
mentator Eileen Shovlin provides the following "Life Settlement Profile":
1. The target market is affluent people, over age 65.
2. The insured has a life expectancy of 13 years or less but is not [necessarily] terminally
ill.
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The typical scenario for obtaining a life settlement is as follows:
Once a policyholder decides to sell his policy, the life settlement broker sub-
mits the life insurance policy to a handful of [life settlement providers or
LSPs] that are available, requesting quotes on how much they would pay
for the life insurance policy given the insured's and the policy's profile.
After the LSPs perform their legal, financial, medical, and actuarial due dili-
gence on the insured and the policy, and assuming the policy and the insured
meet [their] requirements, the LSPs submit an offer to purchase the policy.
Upon receipt of all the offers, the policyholder and his broker will evaluate
each offer tendered by the respective LSPs .... After selecting a provider,
the policyholder is paid the agreed-upon amount and the policy is assigned
to the LSP or its designee. After the policyholder has accepted a life settle-
ment offer, the policyholder no longer has any obligation to pay premiums
on the life insurance policy because the owner and beneficiary of the policy
is now the LSP. The original owner assigns the policy to the LSP; therefore
it is the responsibility of the LSP [and subsequent investors] to continue to
pay the premiums in order to collect the death benefit when the insured
dies.11
The need for regulating viaticals and life settlements, however, became
apparent from the beginning. The significant power imbalance between a
policyholder and life settlement provider created a substantial potential
for abuse, where a policyholder often was in financial hardship due to
medical and health care costs and was often ignorant of sophisticated in-
dustry knowledge and practices. There also was an increased risk of fraud,
not only from the life settlement providers and investors, but also from
potential insureds. Various commentators, therefore, urged further regu-
3. The insured's health has declined since issue of the life [insurance] policy.
4. The average face amount of the purchased policy is large, easily $ 1 million or more.
5. Life settlement financing typically comes from institutional buyers.
Shovlin, supra note 7, at 1; see also PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance
Trust, 28 A.3d 1059, 1069 70 (Del. 2011):
Over the past two decades . . . an active secondary market for life insurance, sometimes
referred to as the life settlement industry, has emerged. This secondary market allows pol-
icyholders who no longer need life insurance to receive monetary cash during their life-
times. The market provides a favorable alternative to allowing a policy to lapse, or receiv-
ing only the cash surrender value. The secondary market for life insurance [including
viaticals and life settlements] is perfectly legal. Indeed, today it is highly regulated. In
fact, most states have enacted statutes governing secondary market transactions, and all ju-
risdictions permit the transfer or sale of legitimately procured life insurance policies. Vir-
tually all jurisdictions, nevertheless, still prohibit third parties from creating life insurance
policies for the benefit of those who have no relationship to the insured. These policies,
commonly known as "stranger originated life insurance" or STOLI, lack an insurable in-
terest and are thus an illegal wager on human life.
Id.
115. Life Partners Inc., 484 F.3d at 289 90.
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lation of the viatical and life settlement industry, 116 as will be further dis-
cussed below.
B. Regulation of Viaticals and Life Settlements
In response to the AIDS epidemic of the late 1980s, Congress amended
the Internal Revenue Code to exclude from taxable income any proceeds
from the sale of a life insurance policy by a person who was terminally or
chronically ill to a viatical or life settlement provider, as long as the viat-
ical or life settlement provider was licensed in the state in which the in-
sured resided. 117 Concurrently, a number of commentators argued that
more state regulation was needed to protect elderly life insurance policy-
holders from possible predatory practices of unlicensed fly-by-night life
settlement companies and their investors and provide transparency, fair-
ness, and full disclosure to life settlement contracts. 118
Subsequently, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) promulgated a Model Act and Model Regulations that was first
adopted in 1993 to address the viatical industry's growth in response to
the AIDS epidemic. In 2000 the NAIC expanded its definition of "viator"
to include persons who were not terminally ill, thus including life settle-
ments within the scope of the NAIC Model Act and Model Regula-
tions.1 1 9 The National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL)
also proposed an NCOIL Life Settlements Model Act, which regulates
both viaticals and life settlements.
Both Model Acts seek to protect sellers of life insurance policies (via-
tors) by ensuring that purchasers of these preexisting life insurance poli-
cies refrain from unfair business practices or take unfair advantage of the
sellers' vulnerability, but both Model Acts "do very little to protect the
companies or individuals that purchase the policies [or] the investors
that fund the purchase of the policies."12 Both the NAIC Model Act
and Regulations and the NCOIL Model Act provide that life settlement
brokers must be licensed in the state where the insured resides, 12 1 and
116. See, e.g., Lisa M. Ray, Comment, The Viatical Settlement Industry: Betting on People's
Lives is Certainly No "Exacta," 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 321 (2000); see also Life
Partners Inc., 484 F.3d at 288.
117. 26 U.S.C. § 101(g)(2)(B)(i)(J) (1996).
118. See, e.g., Joy D. Kosiewicz, Death for Sale: A Call to Regulate the Viatical Settlement In-
dustry, 48 CASE W. RESERVE L. REV. 701 (1998).
119. See Jessica M. Perez, Comment, You Can Bet Your Life on It! Regulating Senior Settle-
ments to be a Financial Alternative for the Elderly, 10 ELDER L.J. 425, 439 (2002).
120. See, e.g., Fiona M. Jones, Comment, The Viatical Settlement Industry: The Regulation
Scheme and Its Implications for the Future of the Industry, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 477, 486 (1999
2000).
121. See, e.g., NAIC VIATIcAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 3(A) (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins.
Comm'rs 2004); NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 3 (Nat'l Conf. of Ins. Legislators
2007). In June 2004, the NAIC amended its licensing requirements to allow individuals li-
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both Model Acts also provide important disclosure requirements for every
viatical or life settlement transaction. 122
Accordingly, forty-two states to date have enacted "front-end" legisla-
tion based on these Model Acts, covering both viaticals and life settle-
ments, 123 in order to provide state regulation, control, and transparency
over viators and life settlement providers within this secondary market
for unwanted, unneeded, or unaffordable life insurance policies. 124 It is
censed as an insurance producer with a life insurance company for at least one year to act as
settlement brokers with no additional training or licensing requirements. See NAIC VIATIcAL
SETTLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION § 3 (H) (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 2004). The NCOIL
Model Act requires that all settlement providers and brokers be licensed by the state where
they are conducting a life settlement transaction. NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT
§ 3(A) (Nat'l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 2007).
122. See NAIC VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT §§ 8(A) to 8(F) (Nat'l Assn. of Ins.
Comm'rs 2004); NCOIL LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT §§ 9, 10 (Nat'l Conf. of Ins. Leg-
islators 2007). For example, the NAIC Model Act mandates certain disclosures to the poli-
cyholder at the front end of the transaction, including: alternatives to life settlements, includ-
ing accelerated death benefits and/or policy loans, are available; the proceeds of a settlement
may be taxable; there is a fifteen-day window in which the seller may rescind the life settle-
ment contract; and how the settlement broker's commission is calculated. Id. §§ 8(A)(2)-(6)
and 8(B)(3). On the back-end transaction between the life settlement broker and the inves-
tors, the NAIC Model Act requires that: there will be no return until the insured dies; the
rate of return cannot be guaranteed and is dependent on how long the insured lives; certain
risks are associated with life insurance policy contestability; and if the insured lives longer
than his or her projected life span, the investor may have to fund future premium payments.
Id. § 8 (D)(1)-(11). For an excellent analysis of both the NAIC Model Act and Regulations,
and the NCOIL Model Act, see Kohli, supra note 3, at 303 20.
123. "It is important to note that a majority of lawmakers have treated both viatical and
life settlements the same for legislative purposes. Most classify the settlement transaction,
irrespective of whether it is a life settlement or a viatical settlement, as a 'viatical settle-
ment.'" Kohli, supra note 3, at 303 n.112.
124. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 21-96-110 (2000) (viatical statute); ARIz. REV. STATE. ANN.
§ 20-3201(10)(a) (2013) (viatical statute); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-81-801 (2009) (life settlement
statute); CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.3 (2009) (life settlement statute); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-7-
601 (2006) (viatical statute); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-465 (2008) (life settlement stat-
ute); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18. § 7501 et seq. (1999) (viatical statute); FLA. STAT. § 626.991
(1996) (viatical statute); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-59-1 (West 2009) (life settlement statute);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1950 (2009) (life settlement statute); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 159/1
(2010) (viatical statute); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-19.8 et seq. (2005) (viatical statute); IOWA
CODE § 508e.1 (2008) (viatical statute); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-5001 (2008) (viatical statute);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.15-20 (2010) (viatical statute); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1791
(2009) (viatical statute); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24-a, § 6801 (2003) (viatical statute); MD.
CODE ANN. INS. § 8-601 (2004) (life settlement statute); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175,
§ 212 (2013) (viatical statute); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.521 (1997) (viatical statute);
MINN. STAT. § 60A-957 (2009) (viatical statute); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 83-7-203 (2000) (viatical
statute); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-1301 (1997) (viatical statute); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-1101 (2008) (viatical statute); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 688C.010 (2009) (viatical statute);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 408-D:1 (2010) (life settlement statute); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30B-
1 (2005) (life settlement statute); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-20A-1 (2000) (viatical statute); N.Y.
INS. LAW § 7801 (2010) (life settlement statute); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-58-200 (2002)
(viatical statute); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 26.1-33.3-01 (viatical statute); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 26.1-33.4-01 (life settlement statute); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3916.01 (2008) (viatical
statute); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36 § 4055.1 (2008) viatical statute); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 744.318
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important to understand, however, that these state acts do not regulate
the "back-end" relationship between life settlement providers and their
investors, which is a relationship that is most often regulated by securities
law. 125
C. Legal Challenges to State Regulation of Viaticals and Life Settlement
State regulation 126 of viators and life settlement providers has not been
without legal challenges in various federal courts. In the case of Life Part-
ners, Incorporated v. Morrison,127 for example, "Jane Doe," a resident of
Martinsville, Virginia, who was terminally ill with AIDS and had six to
eighteen months left to live, sold her life insurance policy at a deep dis-
count to Life Partners, Inc., a Texas corporation, in order to be provided
with cash needed for the remaining months of her life. 128 Life Partners,
Inc. engages nationally in the business of viatical settlements and was
licensed as a viatical settlement provider under Texas law, but was not li-
censed to do business in Virginia. 129 Life Partners locates investors to buy
life insurance policies and pay the premiums and negotiates with viators
or their brokers for the purchase of their life insurance policies. Its profits,
and those of its investors, are determined by the difference between (1) the
face amount of the policy paid on the viator's death and (2) the cost of the
policy, the cost of paying premiums until the viator's death, and adminis-
trative expenses. 130
In July 2004, Jane Doe accepted Life Partners' final bid of $29,900 for
her life insurance policy, representing 26 percent of the face value of the
(2010) (life settlement statute); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 626.1 (2002) (viatical statute); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-72-1 (life settlement statute); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-102 (2006) (vi-
atical statute); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-50-101 (2009) (viatical statute); TEX. CODE ANN.
§ 111 1A.001 (2011) (life settlement statute); UTAH CODE ANN. § 3 IA-36-101 (2009) (life set-
tlement statute); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-6000 (2003) (viatical statute); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 48.102.001 (2009) (life settlement statute); V.VA. CODE ANN. § 33 -13C-1 (2008) (vi-
atical statute); VIs. STAT. ANN. § 632.69 (proposed) (life settlement statute).
125. See, e.g., Life Partners Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 289 90 (4th Cir. 2007); see also
Shovlin, supra note 7, at 1:
If a policy owner sells a policy to a licensed [life] settlement provider and the transaction
has been consummated in accordance with the state's viatical and life settlement laws and
regulations (the "front end"), [then] the client and his insurance advisor have not partici-
pated in the transaction regulated as a security. If, however, an insurance advisor is raising
funds for financing entities or reselling purchased policies to individual investors (the
"back end") this, according to most states, would constitute a security.
Id.; see also Miriam R. Albert, The Future of Death Futures: Why Viatical Settlements Must be
Classified as Securities, 19 PACE L. REV. 345 (1999).
126. See supra notes 119 25 and accompanying text.
127. Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying Va. law).
128. Id. at 290.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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policy. However, five months later, she contacted Life Partners, demanding
that it pay her more money, based upon the Virginia Viatical Settlements
Act131 and its enabling administrative regulations. 132 That Act would have
required Life Partners to pay her at least $69,000, and maybe more, de-
pending on the applicable range of her life expectancy. Life Partners re-
fused her demand, and she filed a complaint with the Virginia Bureau of
Insurance, which conducted an inquiry and concluded that Life Partners
"had acted as an unlicensed viatical settlement provider with a Virginia
resident. ' 133 In May 2005, Life Partners commenced an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the Virginia State Corporation Commis-
sion and the Virginia Bureau of Insurance violated the dormant Commerce
Clause by attempting to enforce the Virginia Viatical Settlements Act. 13 4
The Fourth Circuit found that the Virginia Act "relates to" and "reg-
ulates" the business of insurance under the McCarren-Ferguson Act, 135
and therefore there was no violation of the Commerce Clause:
In sum, we have little difficulty in concluding that the Virginia Viatical Set-
dements Act relates to the regulation of the business of insurance; was en-
acted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance; and indeed reg-
ulates directly and substantially the actual business of insurance. Thus, the
McCarren-Ferguson Act saves the Act from any dormant Commerce Clause
challenge. 13 6
The Fourth Circuit was careful to note, however, that the Viatical Set-
tlements Act only regulated the front-end insurance"side of the viatical
transaction-involving the provider's purchase of life insurance policies
from viators-and did not regulate the relationship between the life set-
tlement providers and their investors, the so-called back-end securities
side of the life settlement business. 137
Likewise, in the case of National Viatical, Inc. v. Oxendine,138 the plain-
tiffs brought a constitutional challenge against the Georgia Life Settle-
ments Act,139 which once again was based on model legislation drafted
by the NAIC. 140 The Georgia district court judge dismissed with prejudice
the plaintiffs' contention that the Georgia Life Settlements Act allegedly
violated the Commerce, Contracts, Takings, and Supremacy Clauses, 141
131. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2 -6000 etseq. (2003).
132. See 14 VA. ADIN. CODE § 5-71-60(A) (2006).
133. Life Partners, 484 F.3d at 290.
134. Id. at 291.
135. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012.
136. Life Partners, 484 F.3d at 299.
137. Id. at 289 90, 297 98.
138. Nat'l Viatical, Inc. v. Oxendine, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25851 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
139. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-59-1.
140. See supra notes 119 22 and accompanying text.
141. Oxendine, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25851, at *4-10.
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and the Eleventh Circuit subsequently affirmed this lower court
decision. 142
Consequently, state regulation of front-end viatical and life settlement
transactions between viators and life settlement brokers has been upheld
by various courts under the state's power to regulate the business of insur-
ance under the McCarren-Ferguson Act, 143 and the core provisions of
state life settlements acts "ensure that the [life settlement] providers are
reliable; require full disclosures to viators; protect the privacy of viators;
establish minimum prices for policies; and prohibit fraud. ' 144 However,
the back-end transactions between life settlement providers and their in-
vestors are normally regulated by securities law. 145
D. Voluntary Regulation of the Life Settlement Industry
In addition to state governmental regulation of the life settlement indus-
try, a number of life settlement companies have joined together to create a
voluntary nonprofit Life Insurance Settlement Association (LISA), which
presently includes more than a hundred companies.1 46 LISA further pub-
licizes and helps fund various papers and articles that are supportive of the
life settlement industry. 147
142. Nat'l Viatical Inc. v. Oxendine, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 7497 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (apply-
ing Georgia law).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1012.
144. Life Partners, 484 F.3d at 288.
145. See supra notes 125 and 137 and accompanying text.
146. See generally Life Insurance Settlement Association, at www.lisa.org:
Established in 1994, the Life Insurance Settlement Association is the oldest and largest
trade organization in the life settlement market. Its goal is to advance the highest standards
of conduct for market participants and to promote education and awareness to consumers,
investors, and public officials. LISA represents more than 100 member firms including
2,500 professionals from life settlement brokers, life settlement providers, institutional in-
vestors, life settlement servicers, and other service providers.
147. See, e.g., LISA White Paper, supra note 3; see also Alfonso V. Januario & Narayan Y.
Naik, Empirical Investigations of Life Settlements: The Secondary Market for Life Insurance Policies
(June 10, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/absract=2278229:
Abstract: In recent years, a secondary market for life insurance policies, known as the life
settlement market, has developed in the United States. This market enables policy holders
wishing to discontinue their life insurance policies to realize the market value of their pol-
icies. Using comprehensive data set from a single large market participant of 9,002 policies
insuring 7,164 individuals with an aggregate net death benefit of $ 24.14 billion purchased
as life settlements from their original owners between 2001 and 2011 across 50 different
U.S. states, we answer two important questions. First, to what extent did the presence of
the secondary market make the policy owners wishing to sell their policies better off? Sec-
ond, what rates of return could investors purchasing these policies have expected to make,
given the life expectancy estimates of the insureds, optimized cash flow projections over
time, and other policy characteristics?
We find that by selling their policies in the secondary market, the policy holders in our
sample collectively received more than four times the amount they would have received
732 Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal, Spring-Summer 2015 (50:3&4)
LISA does not recognize or condone STOLI settlements.148 In 2008,
Doug Head, LISA's executive director, testified in a written statement to
the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation that the "secondary market for
life insurance has brought great benefits to consumers, unlocking the
value of life insurance policies." 14 9 He asserted that the life insurance set-
tlement industry is opposed to STOLI, but cautioned that merely because
someone buys a life insurance policy and subsequently assigns it to a third
party, it cannot be assumed that the buyer is participating in an illegal
STOLI scheme by making a straw purchase for a third party. 5 ' This dis-
tinction is of crucial importance. Although stranger-originated life insur-
ance policies (like STOLI) are arguably illegal because they lack any bona
fide insurable interest requirement at their inception, stranger-owned life
insurance policies (like viaticals and life settlements) that have been validly
assigned are legal. 1
E. Securitization of Viaticals and Life Settlements
Although most states have now enacted front-end legislation covering
both viaticals and life settlements in order to provide state insurance reg-
ulation and control over viators and their life settlement providers,15 2
these acts do not regulate the back-end relationship between the life set-
tlement providers and their investors, which is a relationship that is most
often regulated by securities law.153 One proponent of securitization, Pro-
fessor Thomas E. Plank, defines securitization in this manner:
Securitization transforms receivables-residential or commercial mortgage
loans, automobile loans, credit card receivables, equipment leases and loans,
student loans, trade receivables, and other receivables [arguably including via-
ticals and life settlements] into securities that can be sold in capital markets.15 4
had they surrendered their policies to their respective life insurance companies .... Re-
garding expected returns to investors, we find that the average cost weighted internal
rate of return investors purchasing this sample of life settlements could have expected
to make is 12.5 % per annum, which is 8.4% in excess of Treasury yields.
Id.; see generally Dougherty & Singer, supra note 5 (Wharton Business School study of the life
settlement industry, funded in large part by LISA). But see contra Deloitte Consulting LLP,
The Life Settlements Market, supra note 7 (a study largely funded by the traditional insurance
industry, concluding that policyholders with impaired health should retain their life insur-
ance contract until death).
148. See generally infra Part I1.
149. Formal Written Submission of Doug Head, LISA Executive Director, to the Florida
Office of Insurance Regulation (Sept. 3, 2008).
150. Id. at 1.
151. See generally supra Part ID; see also Martin, supra note 8, at 189.
152. See generally supra Part Jl.B.
153. See, e.g., Shovlin, supra note 1, at 1; see also Albert, supra note 127.
154. Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1655, 1656 (2003 2004).
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Replying to various critics of securitization 15 5 and stating that he has"personally benefitted from securitization, both intellectually and finan-
cially, '' 156 Professor Plank notes that as of 2002, "there were more than
6 trillion dollars of outstanding securities issued in securitizations,'157 in-
cluding mortgage and other property securitizations. 15 8 He concludes
that "the future of securitization is secure." 15 9 Unfortunately, Professor
Plank's law review article predated by two years the Great Recession of
2006, brought about in large part by the sub-prime mortgage loan secur-
itization debacle.
One might assume that Wall Street financiers and institutional inves-
tors might shy away from future securitization financial activities as a re-
sult of the subprime mortgage fiasco. However, in 2006, Goldman Sachs
created its Longmore Capital unit to handle life settlements and two years
later created its QxX mortality index, which tracked the mortality of
46,000 people over the age of sixty-five with diseases other than AIDS
to provide information to institutional investors who were prospectively
thinking of buying its life settlement securities. But in 2010, Goldman
Sachs exited from its life settlement business, claiming that the decision
was commercial, although some analysts believed that it did not want to
antagonize traditional life insurance companies holding large stock and
bond portfolios. 16° Accordingly, most viatical and life settlement con-
tracts today are financed by private investors and hedge funds. 16 1
111. STRANGER- ORIGINATED LIFE INSURANCE (STOLI)
A. What is STOLI?
Stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI) differs significantly from
stranger-owned life insurance. Stranger-owned life insurance, including
viaticals and life settlements, 162 generally involves the valid assignment
of a preexisting and bona fide insurable interest. 163 Stranger-originated
155. See, e.g., David Ray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1055 (1998); Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's Perspective,
76 TEx. L. REV. 595 (1998); Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Secur-
itization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503 (2002).
156. Plank, supra note 154, at 1657 n. 9.
157. Id. at 1656.
158. Id. at 1672 78.
159. Id. at 1730.
160. Martin, supra note 8, at 192 196, 193. Credit Suisse also bought a life settlement
company and created a group dedicated to buying, packaging, and reselling large numbers
of life insurance policies. The company has not ruled out life settlement securitizations in
the future. Id.
161. Id. at 197.
162. See generally supra Part II.
163. See generally supra Part I.D.
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life insurance, on the other hand, is based on a fraudulent and deceitful
insurance scheme, lacking any bona fide insurable interest in the life of
another.
One court has described how a typical STOLI transaction is
structured:
An agent attempts to sell a life insurance policy to an elderly insurable can-
didate, and offers the candidate up-front cash in exchange for promising a
future sale of the policy. The agent informs the candidate that the candidate
will be able to obtain the policy at virtually no cost to himself, because the
agent has secured non-recourse financing to purchase the policy. The candi-
date then acts as a 'nominal grantor' of a life insurance trust that is used to
apply for the policy. At that time, the agent will tell the insured that, in all
probability, the policy will be sold to investors for a price that will pay the
loan and accrued interest, leaving a profit to split between the agent and
the insured .... If the insured survives [the two-year incontestability period
on the policy], the owner (the life insurance trustee) typically has two op-
tions, in addition to the sale of the policies to the investors: (1) have the in-
sured pay the outstanding debt with accrued interest and retain the policy
[but generally involving a very high interest rate on this 'loan']; or (2) transfer
the policy to the lender in lieu of foreclosure .... The insureds are usually
able to garner significantly greater sums from the [speculator-investors]
than they would receive by surrendering the policy to the insurance com-
pany.... 164
B. Validity of STOLI Contracts
1. The Majority Rule: STOLI Contracts Are Void Ab Initio Because
They Lack any Bona Fide Insurable Interest in the Insured
The vast majority of courts today that have interpreted STOLI contracts
have held that such contracts are void ab initio from their inception. 16 5
164. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 (D. NJ. 2009); see
also Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada v. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d 728, 730 (D. Del. 2011) ("In a
STOLI arrangement, speculators collaborate with an individual to obtain a life insurance
policy in the name of that individual and then sell some or all of the death benefit payable
upon the death of the insured to stranger investors .... To maximize the expected rate of
return, STOLI speculators often choose individuals over the age of 70 who have a net
worth of at least $1 million to apply for the life insurance policies in which they will invest....
The speculators will usually pay for the insured's related costs, such as the application fees
and premiums, and may even pay the insured some compensation upon issuance of the
policy.").
165. See, e.g., First Penn-Pacific Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 2007 VL 1810707 (D. Md. 2007);
AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Group LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (S.D. Fla.
2009); Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F. Supp. 2d 662 (D.NJ. 2009); Sun
Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Moran, 2009 VL 2450443 (D. Ariz. 2009); Am. Gen.
Life Ins. Co. v. Goldstein, 741 F. Supp. 2d 604 (D. Del. 2010); Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins.
Co. v. Joseph Schlanger 2006 Ins. Trust, 2010 VL 2898315 (D. Del. 2010); Sun Life Assur-
ance Co. of Canada v. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d 728 (D. Del. 2011); Hartford Life & Annuity
Ins. Co. v. Doris Barnes Family 2008 Irrevocable Trust, et al., 2011 YVL 759554 (C.D. Cal.
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This is because if a life insurance policy lacks a bona fide insurable interest
at its inception, it is void ab initio because it violates a state's strong public
policy against wagering contracts. 166 As one court aptly summarizes this
majority rule:
The Supreme Court has long ago explained that a wagering contract "gives
the [policyholder] a sinister counter interest in having the [insured's] life
come to an end." Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 154 (1911). . . . [A]s
early as 1881, wagering contracts [involving life insurance] have been con-
demned as being against public policy. Warnock, 104 U.S. at 779 .... How-
ever, it is well established that, so long as the insured does not take out the
policy at the beginning as a mere cover for a wager, the beneficial interest
may be legally transferred to an individual or entity without an insurable
interest [such as with viaticals and life settlements]. See, e.g., Product Clear-
ing v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646, 648 (S.D. N.Y. 2008) (citing Grigsby, 222
U.S. at 154).16 7
Therefore, according to this persuasive and well-reasoned majority
rule, if a life insurance policy is obtained when there is a preconceived in-
tent of the parties at the time of the policy inception to assign it to a third-
party stranger who lacks any bona fide insurable interest in the insured,
this would constitute a void ab initio wagering contract, regardless of
how diligently the parties attempted to disguise their invalid STOLI con-
tract in an attempt to defraud the insurance company.16 8
2. New York and Pennsylvania Minority Rule: Misguided Judicial
Interpretations of State Insurance Statutes
The vast majority of states have held that the insurable interest require-
ment is of such significant public policy importance that an insurance
company cannot waive or be estopped to assert the insurable interest re-
quirement. 169 However, New York courts have adopted a controversial
minority approach, holding that the passage of the contestability period
in a life insurance contract bars not only misrepresentations made by an
insured in a life insurance application, but also any assertion of the lack
2011); PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust, 28 A.3d 1059 (Del.
2011); Sciaretta v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2012);
PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Charter Oak Trust, 2012 VL 2044416 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 2012):
PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. P. Bowie 2008 Irrevocable Trust, 718 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013).
166. See, e.g., PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust, supra note 167,
at 1067 68.
167. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 733 34;see also Lincoln Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 2d at 888 89 (similar holding).
168. See generally supra Part I.D.
169. See generally JERRY & RICHMoND, supra note 13, § 45 at 286 ("Most courts that have
considered the subject have held that the insurer cannot waive or be estopped to assert the
insurable interest requirement, although the cases are not unanimous.") (citing to many
opinions); see also notes 76-81, supra, and accompanying text.
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of an insurable interest. 170 Once again, this is clearly counter to the pre-
vailing view of most other jurisdictions. 17 1
To make matters worse, the New York Court of Appeals in Kramer172
basically recognized a STOLI scheme involving $56 million in combined
coverage assigned to third-party investors. The Kramer court concluded
that "New York law permits a person to procure an insurance policy on
his or her own life and immediately transfer it to one without an insurable
interest in that life, even where the policy was obtained for just such a purpose."173
The insured's intent to assign his life insurance policies at their inception
was never an issue in this case. 174 In a dissenting opinion to Kramer,
Judge Smith argued that the common law prohibition against wagering pol-
icies under Warnock and Grigsby should prevail over the New York assign-
ability statute that allowed an "immediate transfer or assignment" of life in-
surance policies. 175 The New York legislature apparently shared Judge
Smith's concerns and in 2010 passed new legislation further regulating
life settlements in New York, effectively making the Kramer case moot.176
In 2011, a Pennsylvania federal district court was presented with an-
other STOLI dispute similar to the Kramer case. 177 The court needed
to interpret the Pennsylvania assignment statute, 178 which, like the New
York assignability statute, allowed for an immediate transfer or assign-
ment of a life insurance policy. The magistrate judge, relying primarily
on extra-jurisdictional cases, stated that the parties' intentions govern
whether an insurable interest exists at the inception of the life insurance
policy under Pennsylvania law.179 Conceding that the "Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania has yet to decide whether the parties' intent is relevant
to the insurable interest requirement of Sec. 512," Judge Conner, the fed-
170. See, e.g., New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Caruso, 535 N.E.2d 270, 270 (N.Y.
1989) (holding that under New York law an insurer was barred from asserting the invalidity
of a life insurance policy because the incontestability period had expired).
171. See, e.g., Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Fima, 105 F.3d 490, 492 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Cal-
ifornia law provides that a [life insurance] policy which is void ab initio may be contested at
any time, even after the incontestability period has expired").
172. Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 914 N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y. 2010). The Kramer case is
discussed earlier at length in Part I.C. 1.
173. Id. at 710 11 (emphasis added).
174. A Connecticut court distinguished the Kramer case as "decided on a narrow set of
issues applying unique New York insurance statutes, which are not applicable here." PHL
Variable Ins. Co. v. Charter Oak Trust, 2012 VL 2044416 (Sup. Ct. Conn. 2012) (citing
with approval PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A.3d 1059 at 1075).
175. Id. at 716 720, 719 (Smith, dissenting) ("I see no reason to believe the [New York]
Legislature ever intended to abolish the anti-wagering rule"). The New York assignability
statute provides in relevant part that "Nothing herein shall be deemed to prohibit the imme-
diate transfer or assignment of a [life insurance] contract." N.Y. INs. LAW § 3205(b)(1).
176. See supra note 54.
177. Principal Life Ins. Co. v. DeRose, 2011 YVL 4738114 (M.D. Pa. 2011).
178. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 512.
179. DeRose, 2011 'VL 4738114, at *5.
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eral district court judge, found that the Pennsylvania assignment statute
"does not contain any language referencing the 'intent of the parties' at
inception or that subsequent transfers of the policies must be in 'good
faith.'" I So this court, like the Kramer court, would legally recognize
a fraudulent and duplicitous STOLI transaction, which, again, is against
state public policy in the vast majority of other states. Judge Conner did
try to justify his decision in a related footnote:
This court is acutely aware of the law's general distaste for wager policies and
recognizes the importance of the insurable interest doctrine. The court notes
that this decision does not vitiate the statutory requirement that an insurable
interest exist at the time of inception or that the insured must apply for the
policy.... There may or may not be a fundamental difference between per-
sons with an insurable interest using life insurance policies as a financial
planning mechanism by immediately assigning the policies to third parties
and direct wagering by third parties with no insurable interest. It is the job
of the Pennsylvania General Assembly, however, and not this court to
weigh the competing policy considerations. Neither this court nor the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court can engraft an intent or good-faith requirement
onto Sec. 512 based on its own policy preferences.18 1
A better-reasoned approach to this interpretive conundrum, however,
is found in another STOLI coverage dispute in the certified case of
PHL Variable Insurance Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust.182 In that
case, the Dawe Trust argued that reading an intent requirement into
the Delaware insurable interest statute18 3 was at odds with its plain stat-
utory language and that the Delaware Insurance Code "abrogates older
Delaware cases decided at common law, which looked beyond the initial
beneficiary to the intent of the parties when determining insurable inter-
est." The Trust also emphasized "that life insurance policies are freely as-
signable under Delaware law." 18 4
The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed with these arguments, which
were similar to those made in the Kramer and DeRosa cases, stating:
The language of [the Delaware insurable interest statute] is ambiguous be-
cause a literal reading of the statute would permit wagering contracts
which are prohibited by the Delaware Constitution. 8 5 . . . A statute is am-
biguous if it is susceptible to two [or more] reasonable interpretations, or
180. Id. at *5 6.
181. Id. n.17.
182. PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust, 28 A.3d 1059 (Del.
2011).
183. 18 DEL. CODE § 2704(a).
184. PHL Variable Ins. Co., 28 A.3d at 1069.
185. The Delaware Constitution "prohibits all forms of gambling" subject to limited ex-
ceptions. DEL CONST. art. II § 17.
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if a literal reading of its terms "would lead to an unreasonable or absurd re-
sult not contemplated by the legislature." Courts should [also] interpret statutory
law consistently with preexisting common law unless the legislature expresses a con-
trary intent.186
Thus, this intent requirement did not have to be judicially "engrafted"
onto the Delaware insurable interest statute because it already existed
under the common law.18 7 Accordingly, the Delaware Supreme Court
held, along with the vast majority of other state and federal courts, that
"[u]nder Delaware common law, if a life insurance policy lacks an insur-
able interest at its inception, it is void ab initio because it violates Dela-
ware's clear public policy."' 188
C. Proving the Intent Requirement to Invalidate STOLI Policies
If an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions allow a court to declare a
STOLI policy to be void ab initio based upon a pre-conceived intent to
assign the policy to a third-party stranger without an insurable interest
at the time of the policy inception, 189 what is the burden of proof to es-
tablish such intent? In a typical lawsuit to declare a STOLI policy to be
void ab initio, an insurance company normally will plead two alternative
defenses: (1) a material misrepresentation defense in the insurance appli-
cation; and (2) the lack of an insurable interest requirement at the time of
contracting the policy.190
1. Material Misrepresentations in the STOLI Application
A material misrepresentation1 91 in a life insurance application normally
will void the policy ab initio. For example, if a prospective insured lies
186. PHL Variable Ins. Co., 28 A.3d at 1069 70 (emphasis added).
187. In support of this proposition, the Delaware court cited a U.S. Supreme Court de-
cision, Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Vir-
ginia, 464 U.S. 30, 35 (1983), holding in relevant part that "[i]t is a well-established principle
of statutory construction that [the] common law... ought not to be repealed, unless the language of
a statute be clear and explicitfor this purpose." (emphasis added) PHL Variable Ins. Co., 28 A.3 d
1059 at 1072 73 n.57; see also id. at 1070 74 (discussing Delaware's insurable interest com-
mon law precedents).
188. Id. at 1067 68; see also Frank v. Horton, 553 A.2d 1199, 1205 (Del. 1989) (holding
that a contract that violates clear public policy is invalid as a matter of law).
189. See generally supra Part I.D.
190. See, e.g., Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F. Supp. 2d 882, 887 90
(D.N.J. 2009); Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Goldstein, 741 F. Supp. 2d 604, 613 16
(D. Del. 2010); Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d 728, 731 36
(D. Del. 2011); PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Charter Oak Trust, 2012 VL 2044416, at *2 7.
191. See, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 786 (1988) ("A misrepresentation is
material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent, or if the
maker knows that it would be likely to induce the recipient to do so."); see also Oglesby v.
Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 877 F. Supp. 872, 894 (D. Del. 1994) ("It is hornbook law
that where the insurer seeks a specific answer, the fact elicited will usually be treated as a
material one.")
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in a life insurance application, denying that he or she has discussed assign-
ing or selling the life insurance policy to another party at the time of its
inception or that a third-party investor has agreed to make all the pre-
mium payments, this would constitute a material misrepresentation that
would void the policy ab initio.1 92 Likewise, an insurer would be entitled
to rescind a $10 million life insurance policy upon learning that the pro-
spective insured was not worth $12 million nor had an annual income of
$500,000, but was instead a retired seamstress whose annual income never
exceeded $40,000 and whose only valuable property was a condominium
that had gone into foreclosure. 193
When the two-year incontestability period has tolled on a STOLI life
insurance policy, the courts are split as to whether the insured's fraudulent
misrepresentations in the policy application will void the policy ab initio.
Some courts hold that if the life insurance company has filed a complaint
after the two-year contestability period has passed, the plaintiff insurer's
claims regarding material misrepresentation would likely be barred unless
the policy is void for lack of an insurable interest. 194 Other courts have
held, however, that if a life insurance policy is void ab initio because
there was no valid insurable interest at its inception, the contestability pe-
riod is not applicable. 195 Under either approach, the lack of a bona fide
insurable interest at the inception of the STOLI policy remains of para-
mount importance.
2. Lack of a Bona Fide Insurable Interest at the Inception
of the STOLI Policy
Except for New York, 196 Pennsylvania, 197 and possibly Michigan, 198 the
vast majority of states will declare a STOLI policy to be void ab initio
192. See, e.g., Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Doris Barnes Family 2008 Irrevocable
Trust, 2011 VL 759554, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
193. See, e.g., PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. 2008 Christa Joseph Irrevocable Trust, 970
F. Supp. 2d 932, 942 (D. Minn. 2013).
194. See, e.g., Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Doris Barnes Family 2008 Irrevocable
Trust, 2011 VL 759554, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2011). This is why transfer of ownership to
STOLI investors normally takes place after a two-year contestability period, so (hopefully,
for the investors) a court will not be able to void the life insurance policy for material mis-
representations in the life insurance application.
195. See, e.g., Sciaretta v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1328 (S.D.
Fla. 2012).
196. See, e.g., New England Life Ins. Co. v. Caruso, 535 N.E.2d 270, 272 75 (N.Y. 1989);
Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 914 N.Y.S.2d 709, 710 11 (N.Y. 2010); see generally supra
notes 172 76 and accompanying text. This "New York rule," however, was subsequently
limited by New York legislative statute. See supra notes 54 and 176.
197. See, e.g., Principal Life Ins. Co. v. DeRose, 2011 VL 4738114 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (pur-
portedly applying Pa. law); see generally supra notes 177 81 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Bogocki v. Great West Life Ins. Co., 234 N.Y. 865, 866 (Mich. 1931)
(holding that Michigan incontestability rules applied to life insurance contracts would also
apply to the lack of an insurable interest).
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if the intent of the parties at the inception of the policy was to assign or
sell that policy to a third-party stranger or entity lacking any bona fide in-
surable interest in the life of the insured. 199 But how does a life insurance
company go about proving such an intent?
Issues of intent "are crucial in assessing an insurable interest chal-
lenge"200 and may be further complicated by the fact that the insured is
dead. 20 1 A Florida federal district court judge has identified three factors
to consider when determining the intent of the insured and third party in-
vestors in procuring a life insurance policy: (1) a preexisting agreement or
understanding that the policy is to be assigned to one having no insurable
interest; (2) the payment of some or all of the premiums by someone other
than the insured, and in particular, by the assignee; and (3) the lack of a
risk of actual future loss.20 2 So if a prospective insured testified that she
never intended to maintain the insurance policy and she knew that the
policy would ultimately be owned by a third party who would collect
the death benefits, this was sufficient to show "that there was a preexisting
understanding that the policy would be assigned to someone with no in-
surable interest." The policy was therefore void ab initio due to the fraud-
ulent conduct of the prospective insured as well as the fraudulent conduct
of the third party STOLI investors.20 3
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit and a number of other courts have con-
strued the "insurable interest" requirement to be violated when the in-
sured is working together with an assignee to acquire a life insurance pol-
icy where the circumstances indicate that the assignee is the real purchaser
of the policy.20 4
Finally, there is the largely unresolved issue of whether a bilateral plan,
scheme, or agreement between the insured and third-party STOLI inves-
tors is necessary at the time of the policy procurement to establish a vio-
lation of the insurable interest requirement, or only a unilateral intent of
199. See generally supra Part I.D. For STOLI policies in particular, see supra notes 189 90
and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F. Supp. 2d 882, 890 (D. NJ.
2009); Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Berck, 770 F. Supp. 2d 728, 734-35 (D. Del.
2011).
201. See, e.g., Sciaretta v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1325 (S.D.
Fla. 2012).
202. Id. at 1325 26.
203. Id. at 1325; see also Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 2d at 889 ("Calhoun had
already entered into an informal arrangement to assign the policy to a third party who would
finance all of his premium payments for the Policy, therefore circumventing the insurable
interest requirement.").
204. See McKee v. Penick, 947 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Arizona law
to prohibit the "deliberate attempt to evade the requirement of an insurable interest"), cited
with approval in Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Moran, 2009 VL 2450443 (D. Ariz.
2009).
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the insured is required. In the unpublished opinion Paulson v. Sun Life As-
surance Company of Canada,2"' for example, a Minnesota federal district
court judge granted the defendant trustees' motion to dismiss the insur-
er's lawsuit because there was no evidence of any mutual intent of the in-
sured and the third party investors to avoid the insurable interest require-
ment at the time the policy was procured. 20 6 On the other hand, a New
Jersey federal district court judge in Lincoln National Life Insurance Co.
v. Calhoun20 7 held that only a unilateral intent of the insured was sufficient
in alleging an insurable interest challenge. 20 8 Under the former view, if a
policyholder insures his own life and subsequently defrauds a viatical in-
surance company by falsely claiming that he had a terminal illness, the in-
surable interest defense would not be an appropriate remedy,20 9 although
breach of contract, fraud, and tortious misrepresentation defenses argu-
ably would constitute valid alternate remedies. 2 10
D. Which Party Retains the Premiums Paid on a Void Ab Initio STOLI
Policy?
If a STOLI policy is void ab initio, which party should be entitled to the
premium payments-the insurance company or the third party investors?
According to general principles of contract rescission, if a life insurance
company rescinds its policy ab initio for lack of a valid insurable interest,
it must return the unearned premiums to the insured. 21 1 This would be
205. 2008 VL 451054 (D. Minn. 2008).
206. Id. at * 1, *2 ("[A unilateral intent] ... is irrelevant without facts or allegations sug-
gesting that a third party, lacking an insurable interest intended, at the time of [the policy
procurement], to acquire the policy upon expiration of the contestability period."), cited in
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Berck, 779 F. Supp. 2d 728, 734 (2011).
207. 596 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D. N.J. 2009). Calhoun involved a legal action among a life in-
surance company, an insured, and the trustee of a trust that owned the policy and was the
policy's beneficiary, seeking a declaration that the life insurance policy was void ab initio
for lack of an insurable interest where the insured allegedly purchased policies using bor-
rowed funds and with the intent of selling these policies to stranger investors in the second-
ary life insurance market. Id.
208. Id. at 890 (finding that a unilateral intent was sufficient in alleging an insurable in-
terest challenge). Both Paulson and Calhoun are discussed in Lincoln National Life nsurance
Co. v. Joseph Schlanger 2008 Insurance Trust, 2010 VL 2898315, at * 7 (D. Del. 2010); Amer-
ican GeneralLife Insurance Co. v. Goldstein, 741 F. Supp. 2d 604, 616 (D. Del. 2010); and Sun
Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Moran, 2009 WL 2450443, at *5 (D. Ariz. 2009).
209. See, e.g., First Penn Pac. Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 313 Fed. App'x 633, 634-36 (4th Cir.
2009) (applying Ariz. law). The Evans case is discussed in depth supra in notes 36-43 and ac-
companying text.
210. See, e.g., Sciaretta v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1328 30 (S.
D. Fla. 2012).
211. See, e.g., Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Lawrence Rucker 2007 Ins. Trust, 774 F. Supp. 2d
674 (D. Del. 2011) (holding that, under Delaware law, the insurance company could not re-
tain the premiums from an illegal STOLI scheme, relying on contract rescission cases for the
proposition that an insurer could not elect both a rescission remedy and retention of
premiums).
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the major argument of the STOLI trustees-that under this rescission
"tender back" doctrine, a party who seeks rescission of an insurance con-
tract, even if that contract was procured by fraud, is always required to re-
turn the entire premium consideration, under all circumstances. 2 12 How-
ever, a majority of courts interpreting invalid STOLI policies have held
the opposite. According to one court:
[The] Trust cites the general principal that when a party requests rescission
of a contract, [that] party must return all [premium] consideration paid in
order to restore the status quo ante .... Hartford [Life & Annuity Insurance
Company], on the other hand, insists that "where a policy has been procured
by fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, or deception of the insured or
his agent, 'the insured has no right to the return of his premium'... (quoting
Couch on Insurance 3 d Sec. 79:40). Moreover, Hartford argues that the rules
governing return of [premium] consideration upon rescission do not apply
because it is not specifically seeking rescission, but only a declaration that
the Policy is void ab initio. 21 3
Accordingly, a majority of courts have adopted the better-reasoned view
that if a STOLI policy was procured through the actual fraud of the in-
sured, an insurer is not required to return the STOLI premium upon re-
scission, even where the premium was funded by, and ultimately would be
returned to, an innocent third party lender. 214 Moreover, a life insurance
company may also allege that the defendants' fraudulent conduct caused
the insurer "to expend money and resources, including . . . the costs of
underwriting, issuance, payment of commissions, administration, services,
and investigations associated with the Policy, in addition to those ex-
penses incurred in bringing this action for relief" and this relief can
also come from the premiums collected. 215
However, if the insurance company knew-or should have known-
that the applicant for a life insurance policy lacked a bona fide insurable
interest at the inception of the policy, the life insurance company would
be liable in tort for negligently issuing a life insurance policy to one lack-
ing a valid insurable interest. 216
212. See, e.g., PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. P. Bowie 2008 Irrevocable Trust, 718 F.3d 1, 16
(1st Cir. 2013) (applying RI. law).
213. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Doris Barnes Family 2008 Irrevocable Trust,
2011 YVL 759554, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
214. See, e.g., PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Lucille E. Morello 2007 Irrevocable Trust, 645
F.3d 965, 969 70 (8th Cir. 2011); see also PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. 2008 Christa Joseph Ir-
revocable Trust, 970 F. Supp. 2d 932, 945 (D. Minn. 2013); Penn Mutual Ins. Co. v. Great-
banc Trust Co., 887 F. Supp. 2d 822, 830 31 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
215. See, e.g., PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Clifton Wright Family Ins. Trust, 2010 WL
1445186, at *2 3 (S.D. Cal. 2010); Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Doris Barnes Family
2008 Irrevocable Trust, 2011 'WL 759554, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
216. See, e.g., Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation: Insurer's Tort Liability for Wrongful or
Negligent Issuance of Life Polity, 37 A.L.R. 4th 972 (1985 & Cum. Supp. 2014) (discussing cir-
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E. Legislative Regulation of STOLI Contracts
In addition to judicial regulation of STOLI contracts, a number of states
have supplemented their established insurable interest statutes with addi-
tional statutes designed to identify and prohibit STOLI-type transactions
that violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the insurable interest require-
ment.21 7 These supplemental state statutes are largely based upon the
National Conference of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL) Life Settlements
Model Act of 2000; the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
Model Act, as amended in 2007 to deal with illegal STOLI transactions;
or a hybrid of the two model acts.2 18
Basically, the NCOIL Model Act attempts to ban all STOLI transac-
tions by prohibiting any "practice or plan to initiate life insurance for the
benefit of a third-party investor who, at inception, has no insurable inter-
est in the insured." The NAIC Model Act, on the other hand, attempts to
eliminate STOLI indirectly, by establishing a five-year moratorium on
policies sold to third parties when the insured is not suffering a medical,
financial, or family downturn in circumstances. The NCOIL Model Act
defines as fraud any violation of insurable interest laws while the NAIC
Model Act has no such provision. The NCOIL Model Act also has a
two-year ban, which coincides with the contestability periods in most
states.219
Approximately twenty-two states have passed supplemental anti-
STOLI statutes, 220 but the "variation in state [statutory] provisions, and
the fact that life settlements are still unregulated in [many] states can be
problematic for some life settlement participants." 22 1 Indeed, in a letter
to NCOIL, LISA Executive Director Doug Head, admittedly concerned
about the Model Acts' effect on legitimate viatical and life settlement
agreements, stated that the solution to the STOLI problem lies in state
cumstances in which insurers can be held liable for negligently issuing a life insurance policy
to one lacking a valid insurable interest).
217. See generally Bloink, supra note 14, at 91 98.
218. Id. at 91 94.
219. See Martin, supra note 8, at 200 202.
220. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-81-802(24) (2009); CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.1(w)
(2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-465j(a)(2) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.404(1) (2008);
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-59-2(24) (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431E-2 (2008) (repealed 2010);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1962(1) (2009); 215 ILL. COAIP. STAT. § 159/50(a) (2010); IND.
CODE ANN. § 27-8-19.8-20.1 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-5002(1) (2009); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 304.15-020(7)(a)(1)(k) (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A §§ 6802-A(6)(A)(3) and
(12A) (2009); MNN. STAT. § 60A.0782 sub. 12 (2009); N.Y. INs. LAW § 7815 (2009); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.4-01(23) (2009); Oto REV. CODE ANN. § 3916.172 (2008); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 4055.2(7)(e) (2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 744.318(18) (2009); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 27-72-2(26) (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-50102(12) (2009); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31A-36-102(18) (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 3835(18) (2010); WAsH. REV. CODE
§ 48.102.006(25) (2009); V. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-13C-2(18) (2008).
221. Martin, supra note 8, at 204.
744 Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Law Journal, Spring-Summer 2015 (50:3&4)
insurable interest statutes rather than in upturning established law
through new supplemental anti-STOLI state legislation. 222
Professor Robert Bloink also believes that any further statutory regu-
lation of the secondary life insurance market should be approached with
extreme caution, writing:
[E]fforts to curb STOLI abuses, such as NCOIL's Viatical Settlements
Model Act, and many recent court cases, have taken a restrained approach
to the insurable interest requirement, recognizing that a radical expansion
of the insurable interest requirement is unnecessary, even in the face of mod-
ern insurance products and transactions (e.g., STOLI) .... This conservative
approach to the insurable interest requirement is wise, considering the dras-
tic effect a failure of the insurable interest has on a policy, voiding it and en-
tirely eliminating its value) ... The insurable interest requirement has existed
for over two centuries, but is still well equipped to serve the purpose for
which it was intended: eliminating wager policies and curbing the moral haz-
ard inherent when speculators insure the lives of unrelated third parties.223
I heartily agree with this assessment, since recent judicial decisions in-
volving STOLI disputes have demonstrated that the insurable interest re-
quirement for life insurance has been very effective in thwarting most
fraudulent STOLI schemes today, even in the absence of additional stat-
utory regulation. 224
IV. CONCLUSION
The insurable interest requirement for life insurance is alive and well in
twenty-first century America. The purpose of an insurable interest re-
quirement in life insurance, as originally enacted in England in 1774
and as later adopted by most American courts and state legislatures, was
two-fold: (1) to discourage the practice of using life insurance as a gam-
bling or wagering device, and (2) to remove the incentive for the procurer
of life insurance to commit homicide.
The Supreme Court in Warnock and subsequent state judicial and stat-
utory insurable interest laws held that any preconceived assignment of a
life insurance policy to a third-party stranger who lacked any bona fide in-
surable interest in the life of the insured was void ab initio as an illegal wa-
gering contract. However, under Grigsby and subsequent state legislative
and common law precedent, the assignment of a life insurance policy to
a third-party stranger would be valid as long as the life insurance policy
222. See Bloink, supra note 14, at 96 98 n.157.
223. Id. at 99.
224. See generally supra Part III.A. to D.
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was originally taken out in good faith and was not at its inception a wager-
ing contract.
Over the past decade, an active secondary market for life insurance,
often referred to as the life settlement industry, has emerged. The funda-
mental aspect of a life settlement transaction, whether characterized as a
life insurance viatical, a life settlement, or a STOLI scheme, is relatively
straightforward: a terminally ill policyholder (for viaticals) or an elderly
policyholder, frequently with impaired health (for life settlements and
STOLI), sells his or her unwanted or unaffordable life insurance policy
to a third-party life settlement provider and investors for an amount
that is lower than the policy's death benefit, but higher than the policy's
cash surrender value. This secondary life insurance market therefore pro-
vides a favorable alternative to letting a policy lapse or receiving only the
cash surrender value on the policy, which is often very low.
This secondary market for life insurance policies is perfectly legal for
viaticals and life settlements and is highly regulated in most states through
state statutes governing secondary life insurance market transactions.
However, almost all jurisdictions still prohibit third parties from creating
life insurance policies for the benefit of those who have no insurable in-
terest in the life of the insured-so-called stranger-originated life insur-
ance or STOLI.
The insurable interest requirement in life insurance has thus far suc-
cessfully thwarted most of these illegal STOLI schemes, although numer-
ous STOLI "trusts" are carefully drafted in an attempt to circumvent the
insurable interest requirement, through the fraudulent conduct of the in-
sured and third-party STOLI investors.
The insurable interest requirement for life insurance continues to play
a vital role in this newly emerging secondary life insurance market in dis-
tinguishing between legitimate life settlements and invalid wagering
arrangements.

